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CHAPTER I 
E.TRODUCTIOM 
Poland was divided into three sections, which struggled against each 
other ooiitically in the years between the First and  Second World Wars— 
a thoroughly Western (Prussian), a semi-"Western (Austrian), and a   completely 
Eastern (Russian) area.     1'he people in these three areas were subjected to 
various forces.     In all, French cultural  influence was strong but in parti- 
cular in Congress Poland, which was under Russian domination.    The principles 
of Democracy were learned from the French through French literature and 
through the Polish exiles in Pari3.    The methods of an efficient bureaucracy 
were learned from the Pr.ssians.      It was only in the Prussian-ruled provinces 
that ar.v kind of national front had been achieved by the Poles before 19lk. 
This front had been achieved through securing their economic position by 
establishing co-operation for buying and selling with the Prussians.    In the 
other two sections, under Russia and Austria, "the differences of  class, 
economic principles and interests,   of Right and Left theories of government, 
were fully developed."    Therefore,   the new Poland was composed of many groups, 
and 
the leaders of which had never worked together.who seemed to be more concerned 
with personal ambitions than with public interest. 
In Prussian Poland, all Polish opinion was in opposition to the Prussian 
government, but it never assumed revolutionary forms.    Their opposition was 
hostile toward the German masters, but they were unable to agree upon any 
particular course to bring their national deliverance.3 
Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe   Between the Wars   (Cambridge at the 
University Press, 19u6), pp. 73, 150. 
2William John Rose, Poland Old and New (London,   G.  3eil, 19U3), p.  9. 
^Bernadotte Everly Schmitt (ed.), Poland, ("United Nations Series"; 
California; University of California Press,  i9u5), pp. 10U-105. 
- 5 - 
In Russian Poland, the Poles lived under exteeme political difficulties. 
Thev were even denied the expression allowed their fellow Poles under German 
rule.    Even their press and language were suppressed by the Russians.    Their 
only consolation lay in the fact that many of the Russians were treated like- 
wise,    ^he Poles learned from the Russian revolutionaries the method and 
mentality of Conspiracy and from the Narodniki, a students'  movement to help 
the peasants, "the ideas of terrorism and of peasant revolution."    The 
knowledge of Socialism and revolutionary ardour was   acquired by the Social 
Democratsj the  Pan-Slav ideas, and the idea of brotherly relations with 
Russia were acquired by some of the Polish intellectuals.    But for the 
majority of the Poles, Russia was excluded from the idea of Slav brother- 
hood for the Poles considered themselves the great Slav nation to lead the 
others.*1 
The most political freedom was found in Austrian Poland.    In Galicia, 
the Poles formed the upper class of t^^T an<* were, therefore, allowed a 
political status unknown by the Poles in the Prussian and Russian sections. 
They were the possessors of the soil and were, therefore, thought of as a 
conservative, stabilising force to the monarchy; they were mainly Catholic 
which made them additionally welcome to the monarchy in polygot A ustria. 
But even more,  the Poles did not remain against the government, for they 
found that for their support to the dynasty they could wrangle continuous con- 
cessions and maintain a free hand in Galicia.    The Poles there developed into 
a bourgeois class of clever political manipulators.    However, until 1907, 
the franchise was restricted and the parties that took shape were, therefore, 
^Ibid. p.   105; Seton-tfatson, op_.   cit., p.  73. 
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not composed of wide segments of the population.     But after the great reform 
of 1907, which allowed universal suffrage for the elections to the Austrian 
Reichs^at,  the parties became more nearly like the vote-getting parties 
in Europe and America.    These parties functioned for the elections of 1907 
and 1911, thus putting the Austrian Poles in a different position from those 
in Russia and Prussia by allowing them a certain degree of political ex- 
pression and a chance to develop weapons for political combat.' 
When the parties began to take shape in Poland, it was at a moment when 
Russia was almost entirely without influence politically, and when the Austro- 
German coalition was succeeding in its military endeavors.    The Poles were 
able to exercise no power until the coalition of the two Powers had failed. 
Because of the weakness of the Great Powers surrounding Poland when she began 
to develop party policv, the Poles had a double illusion of power—that of 
the unusual setting of world problems,  coupled with Poland's traditional legacy 
of discrete opinion.    Because of no common medium through which the current 
of political life could flow, the three section? of Poland even developed 
divided public opinions,    '^his division resulted from the subjection of the 
Poles to various regimes and also from the legacy of their stubborn 
individualism which handicapoed a cohesive force. ■    One could organize a 
partv on a nationalist basis, but unless there was a further factor of common 
belief the party was usually unstable and short-lived.    This problem was 
Slbid.; Schmitt, op^ cit., pp.  106-107. 
&Ibid.. pp. IOU, 10Q-110. 
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especially prevalent at the beginning of the twentieth century when the 
Poles wanted a free and united Poland.    Once the fact was accomplished they 
had tc turn to new policies in crder tc remain in existence. 
Four major ideologies  converged in the formation of parties into many 
various and peculiar combinations bec-uie no one ideology was monopolized 
by anv one faction.    The most powerful of these was nationalism which was 
apparent in all parties.     The Christian tradition entered the scene as the 
second force, and in Poland that meant exclusively the Roman Catholic Church. 
Democracy was the third force whether it was political, economic, or social. 
n 
The last force was Socialism.' 
There were three main party groupings in the Parliaments which were 
elected from 1919 throughout the twenties.     These were the National Democratic 
Party on the Right, the larger of the two Peasant Parties in the Center, and 
the Socialists and Liberation (smaller Peasant Party) on   the left.    The 
Minority groups made up almost one-fifth of the deputies to the Seym (diet )♦ On a 
national issue the Center usually voted with the Right, thus aaking a majority, 
but on a social issue it usually voted with the Left, thus causing a deadlock. 
The Minority groups decided the question, and their vote was usually anti- 
o 
Right, for the Right was intolerant toward'-the Minorities.0 
The party of the Right, the National Democrats, was c* the *iddle  class, 
intensely nationalistic, socially Conservative,  anti-Semitic,  and strongly 
7Ibid., pp. 110-1il. 
William John Rose, The Growth of Polish Democracy, Printed for the 
Polish Publications CcmmiTEee (Liverpool, Lonflbn, and Prescot:    C. Timing 
and Company,  lttt., 19U5.)  pp. 16-17.    This will be referred to in subse- 
qaent footnotes as QPD. 
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opposed to Piisudski and his followers, for they considered Pilsudski too 
revolutionary and were shocked by his relations with Germany and Austria, 
which were    to them much greater enemies than Russia. 
The Peasant Party which constituted the Center had its beginnings in 
the over-crowded areas of small holders in Qalicia, a part of Russian Poland. 
They were always anti-Russian and bedame anti-Austrian after the Treaty of 
3rest-Litovsk by Russia and the Entente Powers.     The leader of this party was 
Wincent Witos, a humbly-born but well-endowed man who had moderate views, 
was prepared to compromise with anyone, and was not insistent on quick changes, 
especially in land reforms.10 
The Left was composed of Socialists and of the Liberation rarty or left- 
wing peasantry.    This group of peasantry had inherited from the Russian 
peasant movement the more radical views, tad therefore, constantly pressed 
for revolutionary measures.    They were not able for eleven years to reach a 
basis for unification with the Peaatat Party in the restored Poland. 
With the rise of industry in Poland in the nineteenth century, many 
Poles had turned to Marxian Socialism and had worked with the Russian 
Socialists.     But Socialism became "national in sentiment" as well as in class, 
thus creating a desire among the Poles to urge action on patriotic grounds. 
The Polish Socialist Party, therefore split in two on the question of Polish 
?Ibld., p.  9. 
10Ibid., pp.   7-3; Seton-Watson, op.   sit., pp. 160-161. 
11 Ibid.; Rose, Poland, p.  8. 
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independence.    Those favoring a patriotic revolutionary party were led by 
Josef Pilsudski.     These patriotic Socialists considered Russia their number 
one enemy.    There were a few intellectuals, Christian and Jewish, who led the 
other party, which was composed mainly of the working class.    Both developed 
in Russian Poland, but were accepted by only a few in the Prussian and 
Austrian sectors.12 
In addition to writing a constitution the new Seym, elected in January, 
1919, had the  responsibility o<' reconciling the mixed populations from the 
border districts--Lithuanians, White Russians, Ukraninians, and Jews, and 
of establishing a legal code for a government which had no money in the 
treasury and no resources.     Poland had been devastated by the war; the markets 
of industry and agriculture were disorganized by the new frontiers of Western 
and Central Europe and by the disappearance of Russia from World Trade;  and 
the currency had depreciated catastrophically.1^ 
Although the Constitution for Poland was finally voted on March 17, 1921, 
conditions in the Seym were not good.    A frame of Bind had been produced by 
the thousand-year old struggle with Germany and Russia, which considered 
political compromise a form of national betrayal **      They had learned to hate 
I2ibid., pp.  6-7. 
^Seton-Watson, op.   cit., p. 101; Alexandra Pilsudska,  Pilsudski, Printed 
for the United States by lEe Vail Ballon,  Inc.  (Binghamtom, N. T.:    Eodd, 
Mead 4 Co., l9Ul), PP- 286-287. 
p.  8. 
ll|Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy (New York*    Wiley Press, 1959), 
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governments as a result of their repression by them,    furthermore, they had 
always been oppositionists in the foreign governments.    Opposition in the 
Seym,  therefore, was not generally loyal and often allowed politics to be- 
come involved with the dislike of certain personalities.15   Politics thus 
began to revolve around two points: 
1. The antipathy of the National Democrats to Josef Pilsudski. 
2. "The tendency of the Witos  Peasant Group to think in terms 
of nationalism rather than of classor state." 
This last point meant that the Peasant Group, hoping the National Democrats 
would renounce their opposition to needed agrarian reforms, tended to ally 
themselves with that group instead of working with the socialists-labor 
groups and the Minorities "on    the democratic foundations laid down in the 
Constitution.tl16 
The Constitution adopted was  based more on the French model than on the 
American.    A new upper house, the Senate, was created, but the Seym still 
retained the major power.    The authority of the President was strictly limited.1? 
These decisions were founded not so much on prinicple as on the determination 
of the Right,  the National Democrats, to reduce the power of Pilsudski, for 
all felt that he would be elected President.18    Pilsudski strongly disapproved 
Eric J.   Patterson, Pilsudski, Marshal of Poland (Great Britain: J. W. 
Arrowsmith, ltd., 1935), pp.   fto-87?  Rose, Poland, pp. 17-13. 
i6. Ibid.,  pp.  9-10. 
17 
18. 
Seton-Watson, op.   cit., p. 1^1 
Robert Machray,  "Pilsudski, the Strong Man or Poland."  Current History, 
XXXIII (November, 1930), 197. 
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of the limited power of the executive and declared that he would not run 
for the Presidency. 
Conditions continued to remain in disorder throughout the years from 
1922, to 1926.    The increasing rivalry among the Parties in the Seym made it 
difficult to form a definite majoritv in Parliament.    It also caused the fast 
change of Governments.    From March, 1921,  to May, 192*, there were fourteen 
different Governments, the most successful being that of Lasislas Grabski, 
who was Prime Minister from December, 1923, until November, 1925. 
Raymond Leslie Buell, Poland;    Key to Europe (2nd edition revisedj 
New York and London:    A.  A. Knopf", 193917 D-   oyj    Oscar Halecki,    "Contemporary 
Poland," A Handbook of Slavic Studies, ed. Lenoid I. Strakhovsky (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts!    Harvard University Press, 19U9), pp.  5*7-5*9. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE COLT D'ETAT OF 1926 
By the beginning of May, 1926,   conditions in the free Poland had reached 
a critical period.    The political and economic situations had caused serious 
problems for the country.     The Government, under the Premiership of Ladislas 
Grabski, a Polish economist, was losing the confidence of the Polish nation, 
because the Polish Seym was racked with "corruption, bribery, and wrangling 
of affairs and post in and under the administration, and concession hunting." 
On November 13, the Grabski Government was forced to resign on a vote of 
non-confidence in the Seym.    A new Government composed of a large coalition 
of parties was then created on November 20, 1925, by Count Alexander Skrzynski, 
an internationally known Liberal.    The new Government received the confidence 
of -the Seym.     But in April, 1926, the two Socialist Ministers of the grand 
coalition resigned because they were not in agreement with the Government plans 
for reforms of taxes and salaries in order to increase the revenue and reduce 
the expenditure.    The Government remained in office at the request of President 
Wojciechowski, an early friend and co-worker of Pilsudski, until the budget 
for 1926-27 was voted.    On May 5, Skrzynski, in agreement with the rest of 
the Cabinet, resigned.    In a statement he said that the Government had resigned 
"because the basis of the coalition had contracted;"   it had not fallen. 
The resignation of Skrzynski after voting the Budget for May was actually 
a necessity, for it was no longer supported by the Seym.   After his resigna- 
tion, President Wojciechowski negotiated for five days with party chiefs;  then 
he asked Wincent Witos, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, to form a new 
Government.    On May 10, Witos succeeded in forming a coalition of the Right 
llbid., pp.  205, 211-213. 
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and Center parties.    The Left, however, wanted a dissolution of Parliament. 
Witos made a great mistake by appointing General Julius Malczewski, an enemy 
of Pilsudski, as Minister of War without consulting Filsudski.    Although he 
was still in retirement, Pilsudski was influential with the army and no 
appointments were usually made without his consent. 
Earlier, during the Skrzynski Government,  the question had come up of 
Pilsudski's possible return to the Government as Minister of War.    A law had 
been drafted while General Ladislas Sikorski was Minister of War in 192U-25 
which seemed to limit the power of the   Commander-in-Chief of the army, 
particularly in time of war.     Pilsudski demanded that this draft be withdrawn 
as 8 condition of his return to the Army.    The draft was withdrawn during 
the Skrzynski    Government, largely through the efforts of General Lucian 
Zeligowski, a friend of Pilsudski and Minister of War.    He also substituted 
for it a new proposal, which in many respects embodied Pilsudski's views. 
In it,    ifcough the President was the highest authority in war, his war minister 
was to serve as his chief aide and was not to be responsible to the Seym. 
be 
The Inspector-General was tooths chief aide of the War Minister in times of 
peace and was to be responsible to the General Staff.    Following this action, 
Zeligowski resigned in order to make way for Pilsudski.    But the next day 
the Government fell, and Witos was asked to form a Government, to which he 
appointed Malczewski as Minister of War.    such a move indicated a purging of 
the army of Pilsudski's friends.     Pilsudski was horrified by this action, 
for he regarded himself as the leader in the liberation of Poland and the 
2Ibid., p. 213, W. F. Beddaway, Marshal Pilsudski (London:    George 
Routledge and Sons, ltd., 1939), pp.  Z2U-Z26, Rose,  Poland, p. 1$. 
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creator of the Army of Poland.3    Furthermore, the coalition was the same 
type which had driven Pilsudski to resign from political life in 1923. 
The coalition of the Right and Center was associated with the assassina- 
tion in 1922 of the newly elected President Gabriel Narutowicz, a Liberal and 
a friend of Pilsudski, who was assassinated just two weeks after his election 
by a member of the Right.    When the coalition came into power shortly after 
the assassination, Pilsudski resigned as Minister of War and retired from 
political life altogether, saying that he would not serve under such corrupt 
people.    There were many others who alsc objected to the coalition.    "The 
wage-earners and the Left were their natural political foes.    The middle 
classes, and industrialists in particular, feared them for their bad record 
in finance.     Pilsudski and his followers scorned them as corrupters of the 
army."1* 
The economic problems began to pile up in July, 1925, when Grabski was 
Prime Minister.    Depression had begun as a result of the fall of the zloty, 
the standard money set up by Grabski, also the Finance Minister,  in 1921, on 
a par with the Swiss franc.    After the Grabski Ministry fell and the Skrzynieki 
Government came to power, Georges Zdiechowski, the new Finance Minister, 
addressed the Seym on the financial situation in a speech in which he was not 
at all pessimistic.    But a true estimate of the situation was revealed by 
the fact that "farmers and peasants were allowed to pay their taxes in grain 
and other agricultural produce „5 
3lbid., p.  22U, Machray, o£.   cit., pp. 207-205, 213. 
\. F.   Reddaway, et al, The Cambridge History of Poland,   (Cambridge: 
University Press, 19Ul"7, PP.T9V'=59^    This will be referred' to as CJP_. 
^Machray, op_. cit.,  pp.  205-206; Rose, Poland,  p. 15. 
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At the beginning of 1926, the situation became more hopeful as the 
zloty began to rise.    However, the rise did not continue because the deficit 
for that year exceeded the Treasury notes and small coins issued to cover it. 
Furthermore, the Right and Left in the Government had worked out a compromise 
for an Agrarian Reform Act.    The act restricted the distribution of estates 
as l»id down by an earlier act in 1920 and also extended the acreage which 
a landowner could retain.    No one was pleased with the compromise, but it 
was workable.    Although conditions momentarily seemed better both financially 
and politically, the improvement did not continue throughout the year.6 
A scheme along the Socialist lines was drawn up by the two Socialist 
Ministers in the coalition Government:    the State was to give large sums 
monthly for the aid of the unemployed and in support of the industrial life 
of the country; the bank of Poland was to issue notes against the deposit 
of gold and silver articles; the salaries of the workers were to be raised 
to the level of the previous year; and the balancing of the Budget was to be 
secured by increased taxation.    The program which the Government drew up, 
however, had an addition of ten per cent to all taxes, whether direct or 
indirect, with a readjustment downward of the salaries of workers, thus 
increasing the revenue and reducing the expenditure.    Therefore, the two 
Socialist Ministers withdrew from the Government and the Socialist Party 
withdrew from the grand coalition.    The resignation of the Socialists in 
April and the fall of the Government in May gave fresh impetus to the fall 
of the zloty and the deepening of the depression on  7 
Slachray,  o£.  cit.,  pp.  20*-207. 
7Ibid., pp. 211-213. 
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Ifter Skxzynski resigned and Witos became Prime Minister,   there were 
again symptoms of industrial and commercial panic as capital was carried out 
of the country,  and the exchange again fell.    There were also bankruptcies 
q 
and suspensions  of payments. 
A rumor spread throughout Warsaw on the night of May 10-11 that shots 
had been fired at Pilsudski's house at Sulejowek.     Pilsudski was declared by 
his supporters to be the Saviour of the country}   they forced the orchestras 
in the cafes to play the march of Pilsudski's Legions    and hung posters 
declaring their faith in Pilsudski on the walls of the cafes.    Riots broke 
out in many parts of the city in protest against the Government.    Many of 
the demonstrators were officers in uniform or men wearing ex-service badges. 
The Press also reacted violently to the Witos Government and in the Kurjer- 
Poranny,   the leading newspaper in Warsaw, on May 11, there was an interview 
of Pilsudski's in which he accuse*   the Witos Government of corruption, and 
he further stated that:    "I do not regard the crisis as terminated.    I 
enter on the struggle against the evil that corrodes the state, against 
parties without restraint, on the looik-out for personal profits and forgetful 
of the general interest."    The issue of the Kurjer Poranny was confiscated 
by the Government, but the attack by the Press continued and feeling ran high 
in Warsaw. 9 
Pilsudski probably did not expect President Wojciechowski to show any 
resistance to his actions, but in this he was mistaken.    It was President 
W, p. 593. 
^Machray.  o£.  cit.,  2lU} Patterson, o£. cit., pp. 113-llU. 
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Wo jcie chows ki who had the paper confiscated, and he also dispersed the 
demonstrators with the police.    Several regiments had collected in the 
neighborhood of Warsaw for maneuvers, but now Malzewski cancelled them. 
Some of the troops then declared for Pilsudski and marched on Warsaw on May 
11, led by Pilsudski's friend General Dreger, and under the control of 
General Zeligowski who had been Minister of War in the Skrzynski Government. 10 
Pilsudski's next move is a mystery to all historians.    He probably 
intended more than a peaceful demonstration.    Whatever his intention, it 
resulted in the coug d'etat of May, 1924, which met with little resistance 
from the Poles.    Demonstrations of Pilsudski and the troops marching on 
Warsaw were to take place on May 12.11    On the afternoon of May 12, Pilsudski 
and his troops  reached the right bank of the Vistula and occupied Praga, a 
suburb of Warsaw.    Pilsudski's men took possession of the heads of the bridges, 
1(W, pp. 593-599. 
^Madame Pilsudska wrote in her biography, Pilsudski, that Pilsudski 
agreed to lead a demonstration with the troops against the Witos Government, 
thus hoping to force to make some reforms, at least in the case of the army 
which he felt the politicians were making the sport of their politics.    He 
wanted the army removed from their influence.    The Cambridge History of Poland 
asserted that Pilsudski probably thought that their military action would 
shake the Government down    and that President Wojciechowski would then summon 
a Government of Pilsudski's friends.    William Rose in Poland Old and New 
suggested that  Pilsudski was persuaded by friends to resort to military 
action.    Seton-Watson in Eastern Europe Between the Wars thought it was all 
Pilsudski's idea. 
- 16 - 
The Kierfeedza and the Poniatowski across the Vistula into Warsaw.     "By 
crossing the Vistula he had outflanked his enemy and bought himself unopposed 
to the back-door, as it were,   of Warsaw, and by his success in seizing the 
bridgeheads he kept the back-door open to him as soon as ha cared to enter."12 
President Wojciechowski, whotas summoned from his sunnier residence at 
Spala, met Pilsudski on the Poniatowski Bridge.    He had been an old friend 
of Pilsudski before  the restoration of Poland, but several events, primarily 
the episode concerning Sikorski's plans for changes in the army had caused 
strife between him and Pilsudski.    He now told Pilsudski that the Government 
would defend the Constitution and not yield to rebellion, to which Pilsudski 
replied that if the Witos Government would be dismissed he would see what 
could be arranged.    It is to Wojciechowski's credit that he stood firm and 
remained faithful to his oath as President by refusing to back down.    "It 
was his misfortune, net his fault, that to set aright disjointed time, it 
was necessary to act against the laws."1^      The President then withdrew to 
organize his defense. 
In a last effort to end the struggle constitutionally, Pilsudski's followers 
in the Witos Goverrment announced their secession from the Government and 
asked the President to form a new one.    The Fresident again refused to submit. 
He had gone to the Radeziwill Palace where the Cabinet was in session after 
he left the Poniatowski Bridge.     He exhorted them to do their duty} martial 
law was declared and the Government decided to resist at all costs.    General 
12CHP,  599. 
^Ibid., pp. 599-560. 
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Rozwadowski, an opponent of Pilsudaki, who was put in charge of the Govern- 
ment forces, first tried to get possession of the bridgeheads which had given 
Pilsudaki a strategic advantage.    Fighting began on the evening of May 12. 
Pilsudaki repulsed the attack of Rozwadowski and with his troops marched to 
the center of the city.    The Government fled to the Belvedere Palace, the 
home of the Presidentj their offices were occupied by Pilsudskists, while 
fighting broke out in the streets. 
On the following day, May 13,  there were further efforts at mediation 
but these failed.    The fighting was renewed.    The Government received some 
reinforcements with which it counterattacked from the direction of the 
Belvedere and began to push the Pilsudskitts back,    ^t "now that mass of 
moderate opinion which is the true ; arbiter of revolution began to show which 
side it was on.w1^    The citadel troops, with their officers, joined the 
Marshal's side en masse.    The railwayman refused to work the lines bringing 
up more Government troops, but worked eagerly to bring those of Pilsudaki, 
in particular those troops from Vilna led by General Rydz-Smigly,  a friend 
of Pilsudski.    This action decided the day.    "The Government forces were 
counterattacked in their turn and driven back on the Belvedere,  the fighting 
in the streets costing upwards of 237 killed and 1,000 wounded, but most of 
the casualties occurred among the civilians, who took no part in the struggle 
except as onlookers." 
^Machray,  o£.   cit.,  p.  2l£. 
l5CHP, p.  600. 
lOMachray, o£. _cit., p.  2l6. 
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The majority of the city favored Pilsudski.17 
On the morning of May lU* a general attack through the streets was 
launched by Pilsudski.    President Wojciechowski and the Cabinet fled from 
the Belvedere after hearing that the situation was desperate.    They fled to 
Wilanow, about eight miles from Warsaw.    Pilsudski surrounded the Belvedere 
by five o'clock.     Government troops began to arrive from Pomerania, but it 
was too late.    President Wojciechowski and the Government decided to abandon 
the struggle.    The President resigned his position, which according to the 
Constitution, now went to Katthais Rataj,  the Speaker of the Seym.    Rataj was 
sent for by Wojciechowski.     He was given three sheets of paper vhich contained 
the resignation of the President, the resignation of the Government, and the 
minutes of their last meeting.    By directing Rataj to assume the office of 
Presidency, Wojciechowski had thus enabled the victors to legalize their 
position with the least possible damage to the sanctity of the law.    Rataj 
returned to the Belvedere Palace and accepted the Presidency ad interim.    An 
armistice was concluded between the troops; the coup d'etat of May, 1926, 
was over. 18 
1'The Cambridge History gf Poland recorded that the Government had 
Warsaw bombed from the air, which further aided the feeling against the 
Government, but no other account could be found of the bombing. 
■I D 
Machray,  op.   cit., pp.   21^-217 
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CHAPTER III 
PILSUDSKI - HIS CAREER TO 1926 
Pilsudski ruled Poland for the next nine years until his death in 
1935. Paxt of the time he ruled openly and part of the time form behind 
the scenes. He was twice Prime Minister, and always War Minister and 
Inspector-General. His nominees were placed in all the strategic 
positions of the Polish nation, political, economic, and international. 
Although he was Cabinet Minister he rarely attended Cabinet meetings, 
but his prestige upheld tie Government and lie Constitution. He never 
sought the lime light and was one of the hardest men in Europe to 
interview.1 But before the years from 1926 to 1935 are analyzed, it 
would be helpful to cover the background of this main force in Poland's 
political development after 1926. After 1926, the history of Poland 
becones intertwined with the history of Pilsudski. 
Josef Pilsudski was born on December 5, I867, at Zulow in the 
neighborhood of V/ilno, in the old Grand Duohy of Lithuania. From 1386 
until the third partition of Poland in 1795, Lithuania had been united 
with Poland. Pilsudski was the fourth of the twelve children of Josef 
and Maria Pilsudski, who were both descendants of noble families of 
Lithuania. But it is to Pilsudski's mother that most credit has been given 
for the beginning of his patriotic feeling towards Poland. Maria 
Wtterson, op. cit... pp. 118-119? Seton-Watson, opjt. oiUj  p. 163. 
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Pilsudski had "been an acttie worker in the I863 insurrection in Russian 
Poland just four years before Pilsudski v/as born.2 
She^Pilsudski's motherjwas a remarkable woman, and her 3on has 
given us a picture of the influence .;hich she exercised over her 
children. A gentle spirit was united in her with a burning 
patriotism and love of Poland. She knew th: national literature, 
and feeling its fire, she could communicate tho depth of its 
message to her children. And here too she was no doubt aided 
by the circumstances of the time. For those were the days when 
Russification was the policy of the alien Government, and when 
therefore even devotion to great Polish literature might be a 
moth of suspicion .... It was a period when a sense of the 
danger of the unespected added resolution as to the future, and 
when mothers, in spite of everything still dedicated their sons 
to their country's destiny. * 
On July 4, IQ74, there wa3 a fire at the Pilsudski farm in Zulow which 
destroyed most of the Pilsudski fortune. i"he family therefore moved to 
..lino in which there vere more educational opportunities for Josef Pilsudski, 
although the education was under "a Tussian system of culture, ruthless in 
outlook and application." .therefore, Pilsudski was taught by his mother to 
hate oppression and to try to aid the deivorance of his people from alien 
rule.4 
Pilsudski's mother died in 1884.    Prom that time on, he was more 
or less on his own.    After his graduation form the Wilno gymnasium in 1885, 
he went to the University of Kharkov in the Ukraine to study medicine.    But 
^Patterson, op. cit.. pp. 1-23. 
Ibid.j pp. 23-24. 
4Ibid..  p. 25. 
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in I867, Pilsudski was arrested for alleged participation in an attempt to 
assassinate the Russian Tsar Alexander III. He was then turned loosed, but 
was called as a witness at the trial. Although innocent, Pilsudski was 
sentenced to five years of exile in Siberia. 
.hile in Siberia, Pilsudski met Bronislaw Szwarce, a member of the 
former national committee largely responsible for the Polish insurrection 
in 18o5« Though he had been in Siberia many years his enthusiansm for a 
free Poland still remained. He still dreamed of an armed insurrection of 
the Poiish nation. In addition to Szwarce, Pilsudski was also able to watch 
and to get to know some of the Russian revolutionaries who, like himself, 
were victims of Tsarist repression.5 "They were possible allies. Yet he 
seems to have got Jhe impression thit like the Tsarists many of the anti- 
Tsarists were at heart imperialists, bound to a belief that was going to have 
it3 influence on his political policy."° 
Pilsudski's experience in Siberia did provide two advantages for him. 
It provided leisure time for him to reflect upon Ihe past and plan for the 
future, avoiding the mistakes of the past. He thought the insurrection of 
I865 had failed because of inadequate military preparation and because of 
the failure of the entire nr.tion to rise. One had to approach the nation 
through Hie masses. He found the solution for reaching them, educating them, 
arming and drilling them in socialism "not as a military instrument in 
itself, because its class program for economic betterment precluded sacrifioe 
for national ideals, but as a springboard from which to reach wider masses 
5lbid., pp. 25-36. 
6Ibid.. p. 37. 
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to whom hi3 own 'romantic1 program of armed struggle for nation_A 
indLepanAmot would ap ;.cal." -ooialism was not even a means to ai end, but 
a means to a better means, Pilsudski's Siberian experience also became a 
valuable pas-port in his career in later time a- an agitator and a revolutionary. 
He was able to approach the masses with a badge of authority, calling himself 
a victim of the Tsarist regime.' 
Upon his return to Wilno from Siberia in 1892, Polsudski turned to *ie 
workers and peasants and to the Polish Socialist Party as an organization 
in which to unite these people. He maintained that as Socialists they might 
work for a Socialist Poland, but that dispensing with the Polish bourgeoisie 
should not be included in the program. He was romantic idealist, bit in his 
methods he was a realist. It has already been stated 1hat he considered 
socialism only a means. He was a Polish patriot, not an internationalist 
Q.z  ..arx was. Furthermore, much of his idealism was foreign to the very 
being of the fight over the economic question, which was the basis of the 
fight of Socialism.8 
The first issue of the party paper and its official organ, The Robotnik 
or Worker, of which Pilsudski became the editor, business manager, aid chief 
printer, appeared on July 12, l8q4> m 1896, he moved the press from Wilno 
to Lodz. It was not until February 21, 1900, that the press was discovered 
and Pilsudski was caught. He was placed.in the Tenth Pavilion of the Citadel 
of Warsaw, from which there was believed to be no escape. Through secret 
^Stephen P. Mizwa, "Jozef Pilsudski," Great Men and Women of Poland, 
ed. by Stephen Pi Mizwa (Hew York* The Macmillan Company, 1941). 346. 
Patterson, op. oit., pp. 37-38. 
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negotiations with tie members of the Party by means of an old Russian 
prison warder, plans were made for Pilsudski to feign insanity in order to 
be moved from the prison, After being examined by a doctor who knew 
immediately that it was feigned, but who befriended Pilsudski by saying that 
he must be moved from the Tenth Pavilion, Pilsudski was sent to a military 
hospital in Petrograd. From there he escaped with the aid of a Polish 
Socialist who had joined the staff at the hospital especially for that 
purpose. Eighteen months had elapsed since his arrest." 
After his escape, Pilsudski went to Cracow in tie Austrian part of 
Poland, a section in which socialism was allowed to develop freely. Prom 
there he could slip over the Russian border when necessary in order to keep 
in touoh vith activities there. Near the end of 1901, Pilsudski went to 
London where most of the Polish exiles had established their headquarters. 
But in the spring of 1902, he returned to Cracow and became the acknowledged 
head of the whole revolutionary movement.1° 
Within the ranks of Poles and Socialists, divisions had begun to crop 
up both as to policy and method. As repression by authority became more 
brutal, efforts became more frantic,and mutual misunderstandings grew up 
as a result. There was disagreement between the Socialists who pursued the 
national aim and those who wore essentially internationalists. "It was as 
understandable that Poles, separated by their respective readings of history, 
the fatal partitions and class differences, should not see eye to eye as to 
9Ibid., pp. 40-50. 
10Ibid.. p. 50. 
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the method to "be pursued to right the wrong done to their unhappy country."11 
broke 
When lie war between Japan and Russia^out in 1904, Pilsudski planned to 
haveihe Poles resist at home rather than fight for Russia.    But many of the 
Poles,  especially the national Democrats, refused to follow him.    PolsudstL 
then went ±0 Japan, hoping to obtain assistance from her Government for an 
insurrection in Poland.    The representative of the National Democrats, Roman 
Dmovski who was already there,  persu.ded the Japanese not to follow Pilsudski's 
plans;  Pilsudski's endeavor to seek Japanese help was lost.    The personal 
bitterness felt between Pilsudski and Dmowski because of rivalry for Polish 
support was strengthened by this    incident.    Dmowski was against Pilsudski's 
war measures and plan of direct action.    He was a realist who preferred to 
work through appeasement for the gradual gaining of advantages and, for that 
reason, was willing to pay almost any price for collaboration with Russia. 
As the years passed, however,   their individual policies began to show fewer 
and fewer differences.    Indeed, it has been said that each man was right 
from his point of view;   that both made direct contributions to Poland;  and 
12 that the work of one was complementary to the work of -the other. 
Keanwhile, in Russian Poland disorder had spread.    The authorities had 
declared a state of seige because of the seriousness of conditions.    Under 
these circumstances, Pilsudski set himself to make use of the situation by 
creating an armed force to fight the Russian Government.    He formed the 
militant organization of his party,   the Bo.iowka.    Its purpose was guerilla 
warfare,    U was at this point that Pilsudski's followers |«parated from the 
11 Ibid.,  pp.  50-51. 
12Hachray, OP. cit„ p. 32; Reddaway, op. oit.. p. 112; Rose, GPP, pp. 8-9; 
3eton-./atson, op. Cit.. pp. 159-160, 
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Polish Socialists.    The purpose of the new organization formed by the 
Pilsudsldsts was to preserve the idea of an armed movement of Poland against 
Russia, which, he said, would have completely submerged without it.    Its 
foremost ideal was Polish independence.13 
One of the members of Polsudski's party,  Ignacy Daszynski, who was 
later to become important in Polish history, said of him: 
Two traits in his character gained him our love—his kindness 
and his objectivity.    Infinitely patient, he could pardon even 
after severe wrong actions.    He could bring together by his 
friendly spirit people who dislike one another.    Devoted to a 
work which appeared at that time almost desperate,   living for 
years a liffe'of poverty,  Pilsudski was for us tie most b-autiful 
type of Polish saint who hopes for the victory against all hopes. 
His contempt for death gave him power. U 
Following the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary 
in 1908, Europe began forming into two camps as Austria-Hungary and Russia 
faced each other anxiously.    Many statesmen declared openly 1hat the state 
of affairs was the best guarantee of peace, but others felt differently. 
Among the latter was Pilsudski who felt it was only a question of time until 
any snail incident might cause the outbreak of war.    It was his intention 
to use such an occasion, when it came,  for the benefit of Poland.15 
In 1908, Pilsudski formed a secret military organization,   the Union for 
Active Struggle:( Z, W, 0,),   
which ™s to give definite training to military 
recruits.    In 19IO,  the organization was recognized by the Austrian Government 
as a legal insitiution along with a non-Socialist but kindred Polish 
organization.    These twq, on the outbreak of war,  joined together.    Pilsudski 
had moved from the idea of guerilla warfare to the "idea of interfering in 
^Patterson,  op. oit.,  pp.  51-53* 
14Ibid,  , pp.  55-56. 
15Ibid.. p. 56. 
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a possible revolution as a military formation," and then to the idea of a 
chance of going as a Polish army in a European './ar.    "The idea seemed at  the 
tine to be merely fantastic.    Yet, history has justified its boldness.    The 
Polish army was born before  the Polish state,   and indeed became  the creator 
of that state, but of the secret military groups came the riflemen and the 
legion; and from that in course of time the Polish army.'1 
Afraid that his original program of Polish independence would be overlooked 
in the alliance with Austria, Pilsudski formed in 19H»   the Polish Military 
Organization (p. 0. W.  ).    Its purpose was to reach the populace of Russian 
Poland and '"to unite it in tie military effort which was still confined only 
to a sedtion of the nation."17    In the same year,  Pilsudski delivered a lecture 
to the Geographical Society at Paris in which he saidt 
The problem of the indeoendence of Pfcland will be definitely 
solved only in the case when"Russia will be beaten by Germany and 
Germany by Prance.    It is our duty to lend our help to that aim; 
otherwise we shall have to pursue a very long and almost desperate 
struggle. 18 
This was a strange prophetic statement of what actually was to happen. 
Later,  in 1922,  in a speech at Cracow, he said: 
I saw immediately that the only country lhere it was possible 
to begin and carry through such work was Austria.    I reckoned that 
Germany, with her iron state organization and her machines, would 
at once put in everyone capable of fighting.    Russia was no use; 
she was too confident in her own strength and her policy of force 
in dealing with her subjects.    Austria remained the weakest state, 
maintaining herself alive as the type of political tight-rope walker, 
dependent on her subjects,  the easiest to talk to even if it was 
Austrian,   talk. x° 
l6Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
17Pilsudski, op. oit.. p. 224. <^
'llizwa,  op. oit., p.   351? Patterson, opacity  p. 61. 
19Sii. 
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Pilsudski was for Poland and Poland alone.    He might become an ally 
of Austria, but he would never become an Austrian slav.    Respect for 
Poland had to be won through deeds and iron discipline,  hot through 
words.   In this way also, patriotism would be rekindled, and the apathy 
of the Polish people,   a reaction from the insurrection of I863, would 
be wiped out.20 
When the war began, Pilsudski led his Legions into Russian Poland 
to fight.    The Legions, who met with occasional successes, had a much 
more important psychological importance than any real importance as a 
result of its fighting, for in the war millions were pitted against 
each other.    "The Polish Legion was a symbol of the Polish Army,  the 
first army since the insurrection of I863, composed of Poles,   fighting 
on Polish soil.    Based on a Polish Romantic tradition it was a demonstrate 
expression of the belief of a group of Poles that the mighty Russian 
Army was not invincible."21 
By the end of 1915, two-thirds of the Polish territory was under 
German occupation and was ruled from Warsaw by a Central Civic Committee. 
As the year 1916 progressed,   the Central Powers began to need more troops. 
In a bid for popularity for the purpose of trying to obtain needed troops 
from the Poles,  the Central Powers on November 5» 1916, declared Poland 
an independent state.    But a week later the announcement was made that 
20Ibid.. p. 62. 
21Mizwa, op. cit.. p. 352. 
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"the Central Powers would continue temporarily to administer the affairs 
of the new Polish state."22 The announcement also asked for Polish 
soldiers. The reaction of the Poles to this proposal was that only a 
Polish Government could order the Poles to go to war. Pilsudski in a 
letter to the Rector of the University of Warsaw stated the general feeling 
of the nation: 
If my own government ordered me in time of war to clean 
hoots I would do it without hesitation;  if it told me to enlist 
in an army of Cingalese I would obey.    But on the other hand, 
since we have no government of our own,  I say without reserve 
that if I were to go to war it would be to obtain one for us.25 
As a result of the reaction of the Poles,  the Central Powers set up a 
Provisional Council of State for Poland,  which met for the first time 
on January 14, 1917*    Pilsudski was declared a member and was given 
the Army portfolio. 
But Poland's independence still  existed in name only.    The Provisional 
Council of State was permitted to pass no measure until General von 
Beseler,   the German Governor-General at Warsaw, had approved it.    Germany 
also had a firm hold on the helm of State and armies of occupation were 
spread far and wide over Poland.    Whether or not Pilsudski was deceived 
by the gift of independence for Poland, as were other patriots, would 
be difficult to decide.    It would seem that he probably was not;  that 
he saw it only as a possible means to further attainment of independence.™ 
22Pilsudska,  op. cit..   pp. 255-254. 
25Ibid.,  p. 254. 
24liadame Pilsudska stated that Pilsudski did not share the illusions 
of other patriots; that he recognized the flimsy structure of the newly- 
created state, and saw that Germany was fostering the state for her own 
ends. By accepting the situation and making the best of it, it might 
be possible to change the fiction to fact. p. 257* Other biographers 
of Pilsudski tend to fcgree with this although they are not as emphatic 
in their statements as Madame Pilsudska. 
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As a result of pressure from Berlin, General von Beseler pressed the 
Provisional Council of State to call upon the Polish Army to fight under 
German High Coromand v/herever required.    Therefore,  on June 17, the Polish 
Military Organization \/ithdrew from the Council of State.    Except for one 
■brigade,   the Regions refused to take the oath which would have bound them 
to obedience to the German Emperor.    Their action was a result of 
Pilsudski's decision to resign from the Provisional Council of State when 
the demand for obedience was made by von Beseler. 
After his resignation, Pilsudski was arrested in July, 1917, by the 
Germans and imprisoned in the fortress of Mtgfcjburg.    ae had entrusted 
his command of the army shortly before to General Rydz-Smigly in anticipation 
of his arrest.    The Council of State itself resigned in August of that 
year.    A Regency Council appointed by the Emperors of Austria-Hungary 
and Germany was set up in its place.    A3 the situation became tenser during 
the year 1918,  it was found necessary to make more changes.    The Council 
of State, a type of Parliament set up by the Regency Council, was dissolved. 
A Cabinet was formed in October representing the three sections of Poland 
with the Ministry of War beii\~ reserved for Pilsudski, who was still in 
prison.    On November 3, the Cabinet declared Poland a republic, at which 
tine it was dismissed by the Regents and replaced by a provisional 
administration of functionaries. 
The fall of the Central •cowers even created greater confusion in Poland. 
The Regents tried to form a Government on November 10.    On the 11th of November, 
Pilsiidski arrived in Warsaw after having been released from prison, and 
the supreme command of the Polish Army was put in his hands by the 
Regency Council.    This still was not enough.    On November 14, the Regency 
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Council resigned and transferred its full powers to Pilsudski until a national 
Government could be formed. 5 
With the powers conferred upon him by the Regency Council, Pilsudski 
became virtual dictator of Poland. "Without the use of force, without 
firing a shot, without even so much as asking for it, he became a dictator. 
Pilsudski the revolutionary created a Polish Army before there was a Polish 
State, and then Pilsudski the dictator started to create a democratic 
government."26 In a statement Pilsudski declared himself temporary Chief 
of State until a Seym (diet) could be assembled. Pilsudski was in a 
dangerous position, for the nation was widely divided in politics. Three 
separate governing bodies had been set up - one in Posen, another in 
Lublin, and another in Cracow. Pilsudski, realizing that the danger of 
-5arty strife at such a time when powers from without were threatening 
the existence of the state, when an army had to be formed as quickly as 
possible, and when an economic system had to be created, could be 
detrimental to Poland, summoned the representatives of all parties 
together in an effort to reconcile them and form a National Government. 
A Government was then set up under the premiership of a Socialist, Ignacy 
Daszynsld., who had been President of the Lublin Government. This was 
simply a measure to meet the need for legislation until the creation of 
a Legislative Assembly. However, Daszynski's Government failed immediately. I 
But the situation was even more complicated by a Polish National 
Committee, which had been set up in Paris. The Polish National 
Committee MM   dominated by the National Democrats and had been 
25Machray, op, cit., pp. 58-70. 
2%izwa, op, cit., p. 356. 
27Kachray, op. cit.. pp. 73-74; Pilsudska, 0^5. cit., p. 276. 
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recognized by the Allied Powers in 1917 as the •'offioial Polish 
organization." It was led "by the Conservative Russophile Roman Dmowski, 
and it was to this Government that the Right turned as a result of 
opposition from the Left supported by the Peasant Party. 
After the fall of the Daszynski Government, the formation of a 
Government was entrusted to a more moderate man, Andrew Moraczewski, a 
Galacian Socialist, and his Government succeeded. A democratic electoral 
law was then set up, which made the franchise equal, direct, secret, for 
all sexes over twenty-one, and based on the system of proportional 
representation. The date of election for a Constituent Seym was set 
for January 26, 1919. In the meantime, Pilsudslci had notified all 
"belligerents and neutrals of the existence of an independent Polish 
State, which united all Polish territories. He also asked the French 
to send the Polish troops that formed part of the French Army to 
Poland. 
The French, after conferring with Dmowski, decided to take no 
heed of Pilsudski's announcement or of his request. Negotiations 
were then begun "by Pilsudslci and Dmowski, mainly because both wanted to 
present a united front at the Paris Peace Conference. But neither man 
was willing to give in. At this time, Ignacy Jan Paderewski came to 
Europe to see both Dmowski and Pilsudslci, and it was with his assistance 
no 
and mediation that a solution was finally found. 
28There are various accounts of Paderewski's contribution to the 
formation of the Polish state, some giving him more credit than others. 
Both W. F. Reddaway and Madame Pilsudska give all credit to Pilsudski. 
Seton-V/atson gives the credit to Paderewski. The account by Machray 
vhich I have used se-ms more objective than the others and gives both 
men credit for the compromise that was made. 
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As a result of the excessive demands of each party, it was impossible 
to constitute a Government composed of representatives of all parties. 
MoraczewskL resigned, and it was,  therefore, agreed to form a Government 
of independent personages who represented the three sections of Poland. 
Ten members of the Left were added t o the National Committee  in Paris to 
represent Poland in the Peace Conference.    Paderewski became Premier of 
the new Government, which was recognized by the national Committee,   and 
the National Committee,   in turn, was recognized as representing Poland's 
interests at the Peace Conference.    Dmowski and Paderewski were the two 
Official delegates to the Conference.    Pilsudski and his Government were 
then recognized by the .-Hied Powers. 
Except for the unsettled boundaries,   conditions were in order for the 
election of the Constituent Seym.    Elections were held in the former 
Austro-German territories and in Western Galicia.    On February 10, 1919, 
the First Seym opened.29    "The Seym was composed of many parties and groups, 
and s\amg to this side or that under the influence of political winds and 
currents not often gentle;   the internal conditions of the country,   as 
well as the external, were difficult; political experience was lacking."50 
Pilsudski addressed the Constituent Seym on that day; he then resigned 
as Temporary Chief of State.    However, he was re-elected unanimously to 
serve as Chief of State until a Constitution could be written and put 
into effect.51 
^TMachray, op. cit., pp. 74-81* 
5°IMd.,  p. 81. 
51Pilsudska, op. cit». pp. 283-284. 
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Pilsudski had to turn next to the problem of organizing an army, for 
the Bolsheviks who had overthrown Tsarist Russia in 1917, were advancing 
further and further into Poland. A peace oifer was made by the Bolsheviks 
to the Poles, but Pilsudski refused to accept it. He wanted to win back 
for Poland all that had been taken from her.32 The Treaty of Riga which 
was signed on March 19, 1921, ended the war, and the Poles obtained little 
more than the frontiers of 1793." Pilsudski's idea for Eastern Europe 
was a federation of Poland with Lithuania, V.hite Russia, and the Ukraine. 
But his idea was not to be realized, for he did not have the understanding 
of the groups concerned. Therefore, after the Russians were defeated, 
his main purpose in foreign policy became to keep Russia and Germany from 
uniting, a move which would probably sweep Poland off the map again; to 
keep off attacks both from East and West by alliances; to maintain a 
Strong defensive army; and to follow an independent policy in order not 
to become a victim of an ally.34 
Pilsudski withdrew from political life in 1923, as a result of the 
entrance into the Government of the Witos Party in close alliance with 
the National Democrats. A supporter of this very coalition had earlier, 
in 1922, murdered the first elected President of the Republic of Poland 
and a friend of Pilsudski, Gabriel Karutowicz, only two weeks after his 
election. When that coalition came into power, Pilsudski withdrew as 
Chief of the General Staff and President of the Superior War Council, 
32Ibid., gp, 284-286. 
33BUS11, 00. oit.t p. 79» 
54Mizwa,  op. oit., pp.   361-3635 Patterson,  op. cit.. p. 89. 
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sayingt    "The Republic is returning to the had habits of former days,  and 
great efforts will be needed to make it re-enter the road of moral renewal."*? 
Pilsudski remained in the background until May,  1926, when the same coalition 
of Right and Center returned again to power after having fallen in 1923»5 
35iiachray,  op. cit.. p.  174• 
36Ibid.. pp. I65-I74. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLAND - POLITICAL DIVELOPMEHT,  1926-1935 
There were many influences which combined tc bring the coup d'etat, 
but the main cause was political.     Pilsudski felt that Poland was drifting 
back to the anarchy of the pre-partition period.    He intended to save the 
ccuntry from the Sevm and from all its parties.    In a speech on Ma" 29, 192*, 
he attacked both of these for their corruption and incompetence.    He was 
attacking not the men as much as the institutions themselves.1 
Pilsudski had wanted a constitution for Poland; he had also wanted a 
Government strong enough to act against the threatening dangers, economic 
and international, to the new State;  but the slavery of the Government and 
the mixture of parties involved did not provide for his wants.    Instead, 
the legislative was exalted to the detriment of the executive.     Pilsudski 
felt he had to intervene in the problem when circumstances proved ready.     In 
192C3, public opinion was ready for such a move.2    The coup d'etat Fight not 
have been the least drastic solution possible, but Pilsudski was able to im- 
pose his own solution as a result of the disorders of Polish Parliamentary 
life.     The chaos that had arisen was a result of the actions of the Socialists, 
who had "openly supported the coup d'etat" by declaring a general strike and 
of the peasants,who had "since the beginning of the republic oscillated 
between left and Right, failing to perform the function of Stabilization 
which should be the role of a Center party."2 
1CHP, p.  *02; Buell,   op.  cit.,  p. 
2Patterson, o£.  cit., pp. 103-10°. 
 89. 
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The  great question among Poles after the  coup d'etat was what kind of 
power was to be in control.    Would Pilsudski become a dictator, or would 
he compromise between democracy and absolutism?    It must be remembered 
that Pilsudski had been a conspirator and liked behind-the-scenes work; 
that he was  secretive and let none 9hare his whole confidence;   and that he 
was a military man and understood efficiency only in terms  of discipline.    He 
favored military tactics above all else. 
^ne of the most amazing characteristics of the Pilsudski regime was, 
however,   that he neither dissolved Parliament nor threw away the Constitu- 
tion.    Instead, except for the Ministry,  he maintained the democratic 
machiner?/- of the very Government against which he had revolted.    The first 
Government, under the Premiership of Casimir Bartel, formed after the coup 
d'etat was composed almost exclusively of experts suited for the positions 
and of high functionaries in the Polish government.    The forms of the 
Constitution were restored, but there was a difference in that the Seym, though 
still supreme, was forced to submit to the will of one man, Pilsudski. 
Pilsudski did maintain, however, that if the Seym existed it must function. 
The Seym was for Poland, not Poland for the Seym.      Pilsudski expressed his 
opinion in an interview to the Matin, a French newspaper: 
Is it quite necessary that I should be a dictator?    I am a 
strong man and I like to decide all matters by myself.    When I 
consider the history of my country, I cannot really believe that 
Poland can be governed by the stick.    I don't like the stick.    Our 
generation is not perfect, but.it has a right to  some respectj that 
which will follow will be better.    No.'    I am not in favour of a 
^CHP, pp.   600-601. U r»   OUU-OUi.
^Buell, oj>.  cit., p. 91} Patterson,  op_.  cit., p.  116. 
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dictatorship in Poland.    I conceive of the role of the Chief of 
State in a different fashion—it is necessary that he should have 
the right to make quick decisions on questions of national interest. 
The chicanes of Parliament retard indispensable solutions.    We 
live in legislative chaos.    Our state inherited the laws and 
prescriptions of three states, and they have been added to.    The 
authority of the President must be inceeased by simplifying things. 
I do not say that we should imitate exactly the United States, 
where the great force o*" the central power is counter-balanced by 
the large autonomy of the different States.    But something in 
that order of ideas should be 3ought for what can be applied to 
Poland.. .They talk to satiety of the Right and the Left.    I do not 
like these categories; they cover different social conceptions, 
and the solution of social problems is still to seek.    We are the 
neighbors of Russia who has tried a social experiement on a great 
scale by putting down the eld constitutions and replacing them by 
others.    We have no wish to imitate her. 
When I came here from Magdeburg at the end of the War, I had 
absolute power in my hands.    I could have kept it, but I saw that 
Poland must be prudent, because she was new and poor;  she had to 
avoid hazardous experiments.    The Right and the Left with us are 
about equal,  as the weak majority by which our social laws were 
passed proved.    For the moment we must remain as we are, without 
essaying adventures with the Right or the Left.    Morality in 
public life is the essential thing.    A great effort of honesty is 
needed after the demoralization c aused by the years of war and the 
centuries of slavery.    I have friends in the Right and in the Left, 
but Poland cannot recover on a policy of party—the country and 
myself have had enough of there labels and programmes. 
By decreeing a new Constitution, Pilsudski could hava found a way out of some 
of the problems Poland faced.     It is  possible that this was not done because 
of international and economic circumstances.    Any other violent action might 
have been detrimental to Poland's prestige abroad and to her economic interests. 
Even elections for the Parliament did net take place until the regular time 
in 1923, and then under the established franchise." 
6Ibid., pp. 116-118. 
7Roman Dyboski, Poland (New York;    C. Scribner's Sons, 1933), p. 120. 
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On May 31,  following the coup d'etat, Pilsudski was elected President 
of the Republic of Poland by 292 votes against 193 for the  candidate of 
the Right.    Pilsudski had never affirmed nor denied that he was running, 
but it was assumed that he was.      When informed of his victory, Pilsudski 
said that he had no intention of accepting the election, but that his 
election had legalized his intervention.    He also stated that he was  glad no* 
to have been elected unanimously, for that shoved that there was less corrup- 
tion in the Government now than there had been in 1919, when he was elected 
Chief of State by a unanimous vote.    Pilsidski further stated that he could 
not forget the assassination of President Narutowicz in 1922, nor the shots 
fired on his house shortly before the coup d'etat.    Neither could he accept 
an office which did not allow work that gave immediate results.    Pilsudski 
then demanded new elections.* 
Pilsudski suggested the election to the Presidency of Professor Ignacy 
Moscicki, a famous scientist and an adherent of Pilsudski's.    "The nomina- 
tion of President Moscicki must now be admitted to have been a masterstroke 
of Pilsudski's domestic diplomacy.    It is not too much to say that hi3 
elevation to the Presidency averted what danger of evil war may s till have 
lurked in the country after Pilsudski'3 success in the capital."1°    He had 
never been involved in politics; his past service to the State was recognized 
by all} and his personal nualities made him popular. 
^Reddaway in Marshal Pilsudski says that he did .xnsent to run, but 
other accounts emphasize that he did not.   The New Tork liases for May 30, 1926, 
says that Pilsudski stated that he did not car * whether or not he was elected 
Presidant. 
9Machray,  o£.  cit., pp.  216-221; Patterson, o£.  cit.,  p.  115; Reddaway, 
op.   cit., p.   23U7 
1(^)yboski,  oj>. cit., pp. 113-llh. 
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The Bart el Government, temporarily set up after the  coup d'etat, 
resigned but was formally reconstructed at the request of the new President. 
When this new Government entered power in 1926,  economic conditions were 
in a deplorable  condition.    A coal strike in England at that particular time, 
however, enabled Poland to double her coal exports, thus aiding the »loty 
exchange.    The fall in the zloty ceased; taxes were more willingly paid} and 
inflation was reduced by December of that year.    Pilsudski, as Minister of 
War, restored the stability in foreign policy and later gave his policy a 
new direction by turning from the traditional reliance to France to an 
independent effort to find a basis for stable relations with Germany, and 
etoen Russia.    For as long as he lived he kept foreign affairs under his 
supervision.    August Zaieski and Josef Beck as Foreign Ministers were only 
his agents.H 
Once the forms of the Constitution were restored, sufficient pressure 
through threats was brought upon the Seym to make some of the changes 
advocated by Pilsudski.     In an amendment voted in July by a vote of 2b6 to 
95, and promulgated by President Moscicki on August 2, 1926,   three major 
changes were made in order to give the President more power.    The President 
was given the right to dissolve Parliament on a unanimous proposal by the 
Government,  and he was to call for new elections within ninety days.    The 
President could issue decrees having the force of law when the Seym was not 
meeting, except in the cases of the Constitution and the electoral law.    A 
motion for the resignation of the Government or of one of its Ministers 
UCHP,  pp.   60U-606. 
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could not be voted en in the  same meeting in which the resignation was 
proposed, thus providing a cooling off period and an opportunity for the 
President to exercise his right to dissolve Parliament if he did not wish 
the Government changed.    A fourth provision, in regard to the Budget, stated 
that if the Draft Governmental Budget had not been passed by the Seym within 
five months after its introduction, the Budget became valid.    If the Seym 
was dissolved before the end of five months and the Budget had not been 
voted, the Government had the right to fall back on the Budget of the pre- 
vious year.12    On the same day, August 2, 1926, an Act of Full Powers was 
put into force which authorized the President to issue decrees having the 
force of law, until the new Parliament met in 1928,    The powers given were 
in respect to: 
1. Putting into force laws in accordance with the Constitution, 
and giving effect to its stipulations regarding special laws. 
2. The reorganization and simplification of the administration 
of the State, and the putting in order of the legislation of 
the country. 
3. The regulation of the administration of justice and social 
work. 
k.    The balancing of the Budget, the stabilization of the  currency, 
and the amelioration of the economic situation, particularly 
touching agriculture and silver culture.   *• 
On August 7, 1926, President Moscicki issued a decree that Pii3udski, 
as the supreme chief of the  army, was to exercise his  comnand through the 
Minister of War and could issue decrees concerning its action that did not 
12Machray, o£.  cit., pp 
!^Machray, pj>.   cit.,  p.  225. 
. 22U-225, Schmitt, op_.   cit., p.  96. 
-42 - 
require legislative approval; that he could name and dismiss the Inspector- 
General of the Army, the Under-Secretaries of the War Ministry, and the 
Chief of the General Staff.    In tine of peace the War Minister was chief of 
the army, but in time of war the Inspector-General became Commander -in- ihief. 
Pilsudski then made himself Inspector-General as well as War Minister, thus 
putting the armv entirely in his hands.1" 
The powers of the Seym were now clearly limited, but it still remained 
the body to which the Ministers were responsible.    This policy vias not 
always adhered to by the President, for with Pilsudski's backing he appointed 
some Ministers who did not recieve the confidence of the Seym.    Pilsidski 
also had several  quarrels with the Seym concerning the censure and resigna- 
tion of Ministers as well as the annulment of Presidential decrees.     By the 
end of 1927, Pilsudski and the Seym were completely divorced from each other. 
The Seym was still capable of oostructing the Government, and in September, 
1926, it forced Bartel to resign the Premiership.    President Moscicki accepted 
the resignation, but also asked Bartel to another Ministry, which he succeeded 
in doing on September 27.     The new Ministry, however,  was made up of the 
same Ministers.    Bartel was finally forced out in October, when the National 
Democrats successfully defeated the Budget in both Houses.1 
The majority in the Seym wa3 once again the same  combination of the 
Right and Center which had been put down by the coup d'etat.    Rather than 
15 
14bld., pp.   225-226. 
1 Machray, Current History, XXXIII, 198-199. 
i^CHP, pp.   609-610; Reddaway, 0£.   cit.,  p.   237. 
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rish a return of his old enemies to the Seym in a new election, Pilaudski 
took over the Premiership in October, 192*., and appointed for his ministers 
men who were both his supporters and  independent of their parties.    Both 
houses of Parliament were then adjourned, but met again xate in November to 
vote the Budget for the following year.    A resolution was also passed 
abrogating a Presidential decree, which had limited the freedom of the press. 
After the Budget was voted in iiarch,   1927, Parliament was 3ent home by 
Presidential decree.W 
The struggle between the Government and the Seym continued throughout 
1927, but no r^al measures were taken, for rarliament was dissolved by 
Presidential decree when toy action was considered which would have restored     • 
the Seym's lost power.    In October,   the Seym met to examine the draft Budget 
for 1928.    No agreement was found} the Parliament was dissolved by Presiden- 
tial decree, and elections were set for February, 1928.1 
An effort had   *en made after 1926, to find an alternative for the 
unorganized party system.    Now that Pilsudski was the man behind the Govern- 
ment, the Ministers of the Cabinet were not appointed with the idea of abtaining 
party backing in the Parliament.    By creating in 1927 a Non-party Bloc for 
Co-operation with the Government, Pilsudski hoped to draw into politics many 
people who had remained aloof—people who would possess a creative attitude 
toward public affairs and would not be affected by impressions made upon 
them from Berlin, Vienna, or St. Petersburg.     In reality, Pilsudski was 
17wachrav, eg.  cit., pp. 227-232. 
l9Ibid., pp. 233-235. 
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preparing for the election of 1928,  in which he had to have an organization 
to back him.    The Socialists had passed into an opposition party after the 
1926 coup d'etat,  because Pilsudski oegan co-operating with the industrialists 
and big landowners.    Some of the Socialists, however, found their personal 
loyalty stronger than their socialism and followed Pilsudski.    Lionel 
Valerian Slawek, one of the former Socialists,  became the head of the new 
Bioc, which was to  cut across all parties as a result of the Marshal's 
popularity.     Pilsudski called this move sanacja (purification),  thus 
indicating that he was  carrying cut a necessarv purge of the parliamentary 
system.    Pilsudski stated that he favored the formation of the Bloc because 
it would unite all others against it, and Foland's best hope lay in its 
triumph, for it would not put petty interests above those of the state. 
It actually became a group of Pilsudski's supporters, opportunists, and 
those who were in  contempt of the party system.1" 
The question facing the voters in the elections of 1928 was simply 
whether or not Pilsudski was tc be allowed to rule Poland.     Aie coup d'etat 
of May had been successful; the reduction of Legislative power and the 
strengthening of the Executive had been beneficial; revenue was increasing; 
the income and consumption of the people was  growing as a result of the 
growing prosperity of Poland; the zloty was stable; inflation was ended; 
20 
and the position and prestige of Poland abroad had been enhanced. 
1^Rose, OPD.   p. 18; Rose,   Poland, p; l6j Schmitt, op.  cit., p. 117; 
CHP, p.   610; Oicar Halecki (ed), Poland {East-Central EuropeUnder the 
■Oommunists Series," Published for the Mid-European Studies Center of the 
Free Europe Committee,  Inc., tie* York:    Fredwick A. Praeger, 1957),  p. 101. 
20Poland had renewed her seat in the League of Mationa Council for three 
years; negotiations for a commerical treatv were going on with Germany; she 
had submitted a Pact of Non*Aggression to the League, which was accepted; and 
peace was made with Lithuania. 
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These were the  qualifications of the Pilsudski Government. 1 
'rhe election of the Seym took placd on ^arch U, 1923, and that for the 
Senate a week later.    In the course of the campaign there had been no general 
interference with public liberties as there are in dictatorships.     iherefcre, 
the elections of 1923 were considered an honest opinion of the Polish people. 
The Government Bloc of Pilsudski received 135 seats in the Seym, thus 
making it much the larges*   single group,  but it did not obtain a majority. 
In the number of votes cast for the Seym the Bloc polled nearly 2,U00,000 
in comparison to the 1,500,00J received by the Socialists and the 1,700,000 
by the National Democrats.     In the Senate the Bloc obtained li9 seats out of 
111.    Seventy-eight per cent of the country had voted, and the election was 
considered a victory for Pilsudski, although a majority had not been elected. 
In a meeting with the leaders of the Government Bloc, Pilsudski, still 
the Premier, said that he would try for the third time to make it possible 
for the Seym and Government to work together by having the Seym reform its 
methods of work.    The Message of the President to the two newly elected 
Houses in March, 1923,  contained Pilsudski's plans.    As Pilsudski was 
delivering the message to the Seym, the Somrrunist deputies in the Seym tried 
to shout down the Marshal,  but Pilsudski ordered them removed from the 
meeting for creating a disturbance.    After reading the Message, Pilsudski put 
forward as his candidate for the Speaker of the Seym, Bartel.    The other 
candidate was Daszynski, a Socialist who stood halfway between Pilsudski 
and his enemies.    On the second ballot Da3zyaski was elected, in protest 
22 
2lMachray, o£.  cit., 239. 
22Ibid.. pp.   2U1-2U3. 
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against the Marshal's action towards the Communist representatives.    After 
part of the Budget had been voted by the new Parliament, it was announced 
that Pilsudski was resigning the Premiership, that his resignation had been 
accepted, and that a new Government had been constituted with Bartel as 
Premier.    The Government was  practically the same as that of Pilsudski, and 
Pilsudski retained the Ministry of War.    Pilsudski stated that he had 
resigned because the position of Premier, badly defined in the Constitution, 
was as intolerable as that or  the Presidency tc a man of his temperament.  - 
He said: 
In order to avoid misunderstanding I wish to declare that I 
personally as Dictator called Parliament together and co-operated 
with it constitutionally, even though I could have crushed the 
whole lot under my thumb like a vile worm.    When the third Seym 
began its work, and I saw no possibility as Prime Minister of 
tolerating its methods,   I faced the alternative of introducing 
new laws or resigning.     1 chose the second way. "2u 
Pilsudski then declared that he might have remained Prime Minister if he 
hadjDfc had to deal with the Seym,"a sterile, jabbering, howling thing that 
engenered such boredom as made the very flies die of sheer disquat."2'    He 
continued: 
All the time I was  Prime Minister I was more  Constitutional 
than the Seym, and no one can say that 1 hsve been wanting in 
democratic convictions.    I would that our deputies would not 
identify their methods of work with democracy.    They do democracy 
no honour.    Whan the third Seym started work, and as Prime Minister 
I saw the bad old habits renewing their triumphs, I decided that 
once more I had to choose between abandoning all collaboration 
with the Seym, while placing mysilf at the disposal of the President 
23Ibid., pp. 2U3-2M; CHP,  k». 
2Wchray, op_.  cit., p.   2li7. 
2*Ibid.j CHP,  p.  610. 
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to impose new institutions on Poland, or I had to resign the 
Premiership.     I resigned, and advised the President to replace me 
by some  personality willing to be the head of the Government— 
for a certain time.    I added that in case of a grave crisis    I 
shall put myself at the disposal of the President,  and boldly take 
responsibility for decisions and face not less boldly their con- 
seauences." 
When the Polish Parliament met again, in October, 1923, it was assumed 
that its purpose was to reform the Constitution.    At first,  there was an 
attempt among the Parties to co-ooerate, but co-operation soon broke down 
on a constitutional issue.    The draft of a new Constitution was^ut before 
the Seym by the Government Bloc on February 6,  1929, aiming at instituting 
in Poland a Presidendial form of Government similar to that of the United 
States.    Its   chief advocate was Colonel Valerian Slarfek,  the head of the 
Government Bloc.    The National Democrats were definitely opposed to the 
draft, and the Government Bloc was divided on the matter.    Slawek's following, 
therefore, became the Colonels'  Group, and Bartel led the other more moderate 
group.    It was apparent that the draft would not be passed without some 
changes in its provisions. 
In the meantime, Pilsudski had been vacationing in Rumania in an attempt 
to re-gain his health.     He had s«did that the state of his health had nothing 
to do with his resignation, but it had been obvious at the time that he was 
feverish, exhaused and worn out by the demands of his attention from all 
sides.    His health had be-^un to decline somewhat rapidl-', but he refused 
2%achray, 0£.  cit., p. 21*7. 
27Ibid.,  pp.  2U9-25U. 
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medical attention.    He was back in Warsaw when the constitutional issue arose, 
Which ended the Bartel Government.    Pilsudski was still the power behind the 
President, Premier, and Cabinet though no public announcement was ever made 
of such.    Yet,   the fact was well-known.    It was not his prompting, however, 
that brought on the issue between the Seym and the Government. 
Because of better financial conditions in Poland,  large sums had been 
used by the Government for works of development without the authority of 
the Seym,    The Seym claimed that such expenditures should be subjected to 
their authority,   but to no avail.    Therefore,  on March 20, 1929,  the Seym 
imeached the Finance Minister in the Bartel Government,    Gabriel Czechowicz, 
and he was then to be tried by the State Tribunal.    It was actually a means 
of attacking Pilsudski,  but President Moscicki retaliated by adjourning 
Parliament,    The Bartel Government resigned in April,  and C-simir Switalski 
became the new Premier.    Czechovski's trial was begun, but the Court decided 
in favor of him.    The Ineffectiveness of the Seym was becoming more and 
more apparent.    Many sessions were called and adjourned at once. ° 
One particular incident of trouble with the Seym occurred on October 31, 
1929, when the Seym was to reopen.    Before the time of opening,  a number of 
army officers assembled in the lobby of the Seym to cheer Pilsudski when he 
arrived.    Daszynski refused to open the meeting until the officers left the 
hall.    They refused to obey his order to disperse.    Even when Pilsudsid. 
tried to persuade Daszynski to open  -he Seym he refused, saying that the 
officers were making armed demonstrations.    Pilsudski went to the President 
to exolain his version of the incident.    President Moscicki then adjourned 
28Reddaway,  op. ciU p. 259. 
29Machray, pju ciU, pp. 255-257* CHP, pp. 610-611. 
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Parliament until November 5, Vut on that day adjourned it again for another 
month.*° 
When the Seym again opened on December 5, Daszynski stated that the wcrk 
at hand was the revision of the Constitution.    There was also the problem of 
an essential economy.    But the onosition of the Centrolew., composed of the 
"./itos Pupulists, the National Workers,  the Christian Democrats,  the 
Radical Populists, the Peasant Party,   and the Socialists,  moved*vote of 
non-confidence.    Aft r nine hours of discussion it was passed,  ana the 
Switalski Government was forced to resign.    President Moscicki proceeded to 
brin? all political chiefs together to find out whether or not the Seym was 
ready to revise the Constitution.    The meeting produced a better atmosphere 
among the parties in the Seym.    Bartel again became Prime Kinister and formed 
a successful Government by reducing the number of Ministers in the Government 
belonging to the Colonels' Group,  thus indicating a "less forthright policy 
on the part of Pilsudski."31 
During much of 1929,  Poland's prestige at home and abroad improved 
intensely.    Her products were displayed at a great national exhibition 
at Poznan; her relations with adjoining Powers were improving; and she 
was negotiating for a permanent seat on the League Council.    Because 
Germany was still disarmed and Russia was in a struggle with her peasantry, 
Poland with her army had the appearance of a Great *ower.    But before the 
year ended, Pol-nd's economic progress had been checked,   and the world crisis 
JOMachray, **. cit,, pp. 261-262;  CHP, pp. 611-61 . J** J£ °^ ^ 
as the reason foTBartef's resignation, but **V^ r^^t ~.^E 
since Bartel had resigned in iprll,  and the Swistalski Government was in 
power. 
I 
51Machray, QP. cit.,  pp. 264-265. 
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had begun, not as a result of Poland's actions, but as a result of circumstances 
beyond her control.^ 
After much trouble in the Seym from the beginning of January until 
March 29, a Budget was finally voted. Although the Bartel Ministry did not 
have the confidence of the Seym, it had existed at the request of the 
President until a Budget could be voted. It now resigned, and a new 
Ministry was formed by Colonel Slawek. The President then decreed the 
adjournment of Parliament. A few days later, a statement by the Gentrolew 
called for the "abolition of the dictatorship and a return to the lawful 
regime." On May 9, 1930, a petition was presented to fresident Moscicki 
by Daszynski, requesting an extraordinary session of the Seym. The Seym 
was therefore summoned for May 23, but on that day President Moscicki 
decreed it adjourned for another thirty days. Daszynski convoked the 
Seym on June 23, but again it was adjourned by the President. - great 
cry arose from the Controlew concerning the unconstitutional!ty of this 
action, and an announcement was made for a meeting- of a great Congress of 
the Centrolew on June 29.^3 
The Slawek Government suddenly resigned on August 23, and Pilsudski 
became Prime Minister again. The Ministers in the Government remained 
the same as before, except for a newcomer, Colonel Josef Beck, who 
became Vice-Premier. Moscicki announced the dissolution of Parliament, 
and elections to the two Houses were decreed for November on the basis 
that the previous Parliament had been unable to revise the Constitution.34 
^Roddaway, op. cit.|t pp. 265-266, 
53Machray, OP. cit.. pp. 267-270. 
34 Toid.. p. 275. 
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On September 10, 1930,  Pilsudski arrested the chief leaders of the 
Centrole'vjt who, at their congress in June, had passed several resoultions, 
among them one demandir.3 the resignation of the President.    Witos, the 
former Prime Minister, was among those arrested.    Theee leaders were sent 
to solitary confinement at the fortress of Brest-Litovsk on the charge 
of civil and political crimes.35 
Justified or unjustified, the action was decisive.    He had 
chosen his moment well.    His Government had given the  country 
great benefits.    He had seemed,  at least, tc show marked reluctance 
to put himself in the position of an absolute ruler.    He had so 
managed things that vear after year the S«ym had shown itself in 
the most unfavourable light.    For all these reasons he was stronger 
now than in 1926,  so much stronger that he had now not much to 
fear from the adherents of the abstract principles of democracy. 
The nation was now ready to accept his government de jure    as well 
as de facto, and, for the rest of his life, democratic institu- 
tions in Poland   'ere reduced to an empty form. 
In the 1930 elections, the fight lay between the Government Bloc and the 
Gentrolew.     This time the Government Bloc received a majority though not the 
necessary two-thirds majority needed to amend the Constitution.    The Bloc 
received 2U7 seats out of UUi in the Seym.    The vote was 5,293,  *9li votw 
for the Bloc and 1,907, 3B0 for the Gentrolew.    In the Senate the Bloc 
received 76 of the 111 seats, more than the two-thirds necessary.37    This 
election showed that the Centrolew had little chance of success because of 
the obvious differences in the policies of the groups involved.    The 
35ibid.; Rose, Poland, p. 19. 
36 
CHP., p.   "i2. 
Machrary, o£.   cit., pp.  27^-277. 
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Peasant Parties therefore began negotiations to unite as a Populist Party, 
which had a great influence over the nation after the union.^ 
Now that conditions were set for a revision of the Constitution, 
Pilsudski resigned the Premiership on December lU, 1930, and turned it over 
again to Colonel Slawek,  but Pilsudski remained Minister of War.    In the 
new Seym which met, Switalski was elected Speaker.    The Bloc in the Seym was 
resigned to revising the Constitution, but the opposition to championing 
their friends, now on bail from the Brest-Litovsk fortress.    A Budget also 
had to be voted." 
Pilsudski did not remain in Warsaw for the meeting of the Seym but 
retired to Madeira for a rest from December, 1930,  to March, 1931.    While he 
was gaining fresh strength,  the Government in Warsaw was learning to govern 
alone without 1he hand of the Marshal.     Before leaving, he delivered in an 
interview his opinion on the reform of the Constitution—that the sovereign 
U0 
should be the President, and that he should have full powers. 
On March h,   the Seym began debating the proposed revision of the 
Constitution by the Government Bloc, but was forced to refer it to the 
Constitutional Committee because of the lack of a two-thirds majority of 
the Bloc in the Seym.    A Budget had been voted when the Parliament closed on 
March 21, but nothing had been done about the Constitution.    Also, Slawek 
had attempted to justify the arrest of the Opposition leaders in September, 
38Rose, Poland, pp. 19-20. 
39Machray, o£. cit., pp.    278-279; Reddaway.  o£.  cit., pp. 2 33-28U. 
k°Ibid.. p* 286; Machray, o£.  cit., p. 279. 
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1030, but nothing further was.done about that situation.hi 
"'hen Marshal Pilsudski returned to Warsaw on March 29, 1931, it was 
expected that some changes would be made in the Slawek Government since it 
had not been successful in having the Constitution revised.    Nothing 
happened,   however, until May, when Slawek did resign as Premier, stating 
that he wanted to devote his full time to leading the Government Bloc and 
pushing forward the amendment to the Constitution.    Count Alexander Prystor, 
the Minister of Commerce in the Slawek Government, became the new Prime 
Minister.1*2 
As a result of the world depression, the financial situation of Poland 
reouired particular attention, especially since the situation had become 
more intensified by the abandonment of England and other countries of the 
Gold Standard in 1931.    The Polish Parliament, therefore, met a month early 
in October, 1931, with the express purpose of trying to keep a firm hold on 
the domestic economic situation.    The Bank of Poland was good?  the zloty was 
stable; expenditure had been decreased to meet the fall of the revenue; and 
the balancing of the Budget was to be maintained.     Most of the sessions of 
the Seym were concerned with the economic situation, although there was 
some discussion on the Constitution.    On November 9, Parliament aras 
adjourned for a month by Presidential decree. 
The    years 1932-1933 found Poland more involved in the international 
situation than in any other field.    At the beginning of 1932, the conclusion 
^Ibid., pp.  280-281. 
U2 Ibid., pp. 286-287; CHPj. 213. 
^Machray, op.   cit., pp.  290-291. 
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of negotiations for a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia was finally 
reached after having been discussed since 1926.    However,  the pact included 
no guarantee regarding the frontiers.    Poland and Rumania also signed a 
communique that they were in perfect accord.    Furthermore, with the rise 
of Hitler in Germany all Europe was alarmed, especially Poland, for Hitler's 
policy was expansion, particularly to the East, and the "obliteration" of 
Poland. ^ 
Yet, the political development of Poland was not without its  conseauences. 
Those who had been arrested in September, 1930, were brought to trial and 
sentenced on an accusation that they had conspired to eliminate by violence 
members of the Government.    Witos was given the lightest sentence of eighteen 
months because or his record of service in the early years of the Republic, 
but he fled the country and did not serve his sentence.    The Seym took up 
much of its time with the Budget.    When the Sevm adjourned on March 18, it 
gave the President the power to issue decrees during its recess if such 
prompt issues would improve the situation, but it specified certain reserva- 
tions, such As the maintenance of the value of the zloty and of the Statutes 
of the Bank of Poland.    Most of the decrees promulgated by President Koscicki 
during the Syem's recess were made in consultation with the Prime Minister 
Prystor and with former Prime Ministers.    The decrees dealt    with 
agricultural and industrial undertakings or with the burden of taxes and debts. 
W 
W*Ibid., pp. 295-301. 
U5 Ibid., pp. 297-301. 
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When the Seym resumed its work on November 3, one important change had 
occurred in the Government.     Colonel Josef Beck had succeeded August Zaleski, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs since 192*. h*>   This change was especially 
important since the situation in Germany began to occupy Poland's interests. 
The International scene was becoming more and more the major interest because 
the rise of Germany naturally threatened Polish independence,  especially if 
Germany and Soviet   Russia should cr.me to any kind of agreements.    On 
January 30,  1933, Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, and it was feared 
that the policy of the revisionists in Germany would now be carried out. 
That policy was to revise the territorial clauses of the Versailles 
Treaty.    The Germans particularly demanded the Polish "Corridor," that 
strip of land taken from them which gave Poland access to the 3altic Sea.k7 
The main issue, however, was still the economic crisis.    The Seym, on 
December 20, 1932, authorized in spite of the Opposition the conversion 
on mortgage long-term larm bonds to a maximum of U| P«r cent> thus making 
the present conditions more or less permanent.    The payments of principal were 
suspended for three years U9 Prices had fallen on the goods produced by 
^achray seems to think that Zaleski had to resign because of his health. 
John Hunter Harley in The Authentic Biography 6f Colonel Beck asserts  that 
Beck had been called upon by Pilsudski to make some decisions while laleski 
was still Minister of Foreign Affairs and Beck was Under-Secretary,  and that 
Zaleski resigned becauss he was jealous of Beck's prestige.    He hastens to 
add that it was not Beck's purpose to make Zaleski jealous, that Beck was 
merely carrying out the orders of Pilsudski.    The CHP says that it was done 
because Pilsudski was making a change in his foreign policy from alliance 
with France to alliance    with Russia and Germany.    Zaleski's sympathies lay 
with France while Beck's sympathies were with Germany.    This seems to be the 
most logical explanation although personal feelings may have entered into the 
change. 
Machray, op.  cit., p.  315. 
'ibid., pp.  311-313. 
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farmers, which meant that most people suffered because two-thirds of the people 
lived from agriculture.    Many lived on bread, potatoes and tea during this 
period.    Industry was no longer profitable, de^ts were unpaid, business 
collapsed,  and wages were cut time after time.^ 
In the midst of thsse problems, the Presidential election took place. 
Moscicki was again eledted President of Poland on May 3, 1933, by the National 
Assembly - Seym and Senate sitting together.    It was Pilsudski's wish that 
Moscicki be re-elected, and there was little hostility to the re-election, 
although Moscicki himself would have preferred to return to his professorship 
and research work.    In accordance with usage the Government then resigned, 
and Prystor,  the Prime Minister,  asked to retire for reasons of health. 
Janus Jedrzejewicz became Prime Minister.    No change of policy took place, 
and the Pils idski regime  continued.    A new Constitution was in preparation, 
but because of the international and the economic situations, Piisudski 
felt that the time was not auite right for its adoption.    It was only after 
some agreements were made by Pol aid with the free city of Dansig,   and the 
entire wortd situation seemed calmer that Poland turned towards the question 
of the Constitution. 
Cn August 2,  a project for the revision of the Constitution was 
presented by Stanislas  Carr, Vice-President of the Seym, to representatives 
of the Government Bloc.    It advocated an increase in the power of the 
President, enabling him to govern by decrees.    The sscond House, the 
Senate, was to have powers equal to those of the Seym, with two-thirds 
of its members elected by limited suffrage and oneHhird nominated by 
the President.    The Seym was to be elected by universal suffrage on the 
U9, Reddaway, op. cit.,  pp. 3O30U. 
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basis   of proportional representation,  but it was to lose its old 
supremacy.     Carr presented a draft of the new Constitution to the 
Seym in late December.    It was based on the lines indicated in the 
August proposal.'0 
Little had taken place during the session of the Seym which^begun 
in late autumn.    There were discussions  concern!^ the economic situation, 
the foreign situation, and the problem with Jewish and German minorities, 
but no    decisive action was  taken on any of these.    The Budget was 
unbalanced, unemployment continued to increase, and the Constitution 
remained unrevised, although a draft had been presented to the Seym. 
But after work was resumed bv Parliament in 193u,   plane were made 
by the Government Bloc in the Seym to *et the act for the new Constitution 
passed.    The Constitutional Commission adopted, on January 18,  a draft of 
sixty-three articles entitled "Constitutional Theses" to which the Opposition 
in the Seym attached little   significance.    It was then submitted to the Seym 
to be debated on January 26.     Before it was discussed,   Carr made a speech on 
the merits of the Theses.    During the discussion,  the spokesman for the 
Nationalists declared that neither he nor his party was interested in the 
draft, and they contemptuously left the hall.    The Socialists regarded it as 
a consolidation of the Pilsudski regime and would have nothing to do with 
it.    Other members of the Opposition expressed their disapproval.    After 
more comments, Switalski, the Speaker of the Seym,  suspended the sitting 
at 7 o'clock in the evenin-.     However,  it was resumed fifteen minutes 
later, and most of the members who returned were of the Bloc.     Carr arose 
and suggested that* since the Opposition took no interest in the refom of 
the Constitution,    the Seym adopt the Theses as   the draft of a Bill for 
a new Constitution.    It was passed by a majority of two-thirds cf   the vote, 
which virtually meant that it was an Act, for the Bloc had a two-thirds 
SQMachray, op^ cit., pp. 327-33l». 
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majority in the Senate.    Parliament was about to close when the Bill was sent 
to the Senate on March 12,  and its consideration was postponed until November, 
ii accordance with the wishes of Pilsudsld who felt that some modification or 
expedient of the Bill was necessary.    A revised Budget for 1934 was also 
voted by the Seym, mainly because the two chief parties in opposition to 
the Bloc \;ere never able to reach an agreement among themselves by which 
they could 0 pose the Bloc. 
On the same day,  January 26, 1934,  tha^ the new Constitution was voted, 
Poland also signed a Ten Year Pact with Germany, in which any resort to 
force for the settlement of problems was renounced.    However,  i* was no^ 
to concern the internal affairs of either nation.    All of Europe was 
sceptical of this move?   but Pilsudsld was jubilant over the treaty,    -tie did 
not feol, however, that a war would be put off for ten years.    He said: 
If only means that Hitler has postponed it.    Poland is not so 
weak as all that, nor is Germany as strong and united as he will 
wish to make her before he takes upon himself the risk of a war. 
The respite will give us time to organize our lives, but after 
that we must be ready to defend ourselves.    We have no other 
alternative.52 
During 1953-34, while the Constitution was being voted and the 
international situation was changing,  there were also regroupings and 
ievelopmentfl in the Polish parties.    Members of the Right supporting 
Pilsudsld. formed themselves into a Union of Conservative Organization 
with a ■oror-Tan similar to that of the Government Bloc, bit it kept its 
Sllbid.. pp. 327-344,  350. 
52pilsudska, «P.-2SS&» p. 341. Although Madame Pilsudska is definitely 
pro-Pilsudsld., this statement quoted by her is very possible, Pilsudskl 
understood the ways of Hitler and Stalin, and he was probally capable of 
analyzing the situation. 
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own distinct organisation.    A Pilsudski Legion of Youth emerged from the Bloc 
while, at the same time, a similar group,  the Camp of    Great Poland, 
emerged from the National Party.    Both were more or less indications of Hitler s 
League of Youth.    In 1934»  the Camp of Great Poland became the "National 
Radical Party" with a distinctly fascism approach, but strongly anit-German. 
They organised a militia and persuaded the lower midJle-class youths and 
the unemployed to join them,    ffhe Government was suspicious of the Polish 
IFazi group and dissolved it in July of 1934•    '^e Legion of Youth from the 
Governuont Bloc eventually became so socialistic that the members of the 
Bloc, who at first patronized it, withdrew their support.53 
The Jedezejewicz Cabinet resigned on May 13, 1934, and Leon Kozlowski, 
a foruer Minister of Agrarian Refora became Prime Minister of the Government. 
"Jo important changes were made in the Government.    The appointment of 
ilozlowski had simply been to give fresh impetus to tte   fight against 
the economic crisis in industry and agriculture.    Pilsudski and Beck 
remained in the offices of Minister of War and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, respectively.    The Government continued its policy of trying to 
raise   the price of farm produce and lower those of goods, but the 
disappointing harvest of 1934 kept prices from improving.    However, 
the new port of Gdynia was being completed, and a railroad to the port 
was being- constructed.    Still, Poland saw the bottom of the depression 
in 1934.54 
53lfc.chray, ov. cit». pp. 350-351. 
54rbid., pp. 355-370. 
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Parliament met again in October, 1954» but its concern was with international, 
not internal affairs.    Nothing in particular was accomplished.    But in 
January, 1955, when Parliament resumed after the holidays,   the Seym began to 
..or!'- on the problem of the Budget while the Senate debated the Bill 
oreating the new Constitution.    On January 18, the Bill, amended by the 
Senate, was passed.    The reaction to its passing was more passive than 
-,   ithetie or indifferent, for all realized that the Bill would be passed. 
55 J!he amended Bill was then sent back to the Seym. 
The new Constitution measure, as amended by the Senate, was passed by 
the Seym b,   a vote of 260 to 159.    It awaited the signature of the President 
before it became an Act.    On March 28, Parliament was dissolved,  and the 
Government resigned, only to be reconstituted the next day with Colonel 
Slawek replacing Kozlowsld as Prime Minister.    Although it was not published 
at the tine,   the reason for this move was the gravity of Pilsudski's 
illness.-5 
The new Constitution Bill was signed by President Moscicki on April 25, 
1955.    A scries of Acts still had to be passed governing the elections to the 
Seym and Senate.57    These were outlinedby Slawek later on May 7.    Carr, 
..ho had originally introduced the Bill,  expressed that the system of the 
Constitution was to be neither totalitarian nor democratic.    It was 
distinctly Polish in it, reversion to the old State and national tradition 
of liberty in Poland, for it was felt by the Bloc that only a strong and 
aahopitartoa regime would assure the nation an independent existence and 
55rPld.. pp. 568,   575-576. 
36Ibid.. pp. 501-384. 
57ihid>, p. 592. 
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position among the other nations. It was in accordance with the principle of 
"a free citizen of a strong State.'58 The Constitution embodied the principles 
for which Pilsudski had been fighting since 1926. In effect, it merely gave 
legal form to the system of personal government he had been following for 
nine years. Designed to meet the conditions of the time in Poland, the 
Constitution was not easily understood by other Powers.59 
When the Constitution was approved, the Marshal was ill, but it was not 
discovered until April that he wa3 dying of cancer. Therefore, at the time 
when the Constitution was passed, many people felt that Pilsudski would 
become President of the Bapublic of Poland. Although he had been seriously 
ill at various time since 1931, the Imowledge had been kept from most 
people, and they were, therefore, not aware of the seriousness of Pilsudski's 
illness. On Hay 12, Pilsudski died and the entire nation was shocked. 
Pilsudsid. had attempted to prepare Poland to develop without his rule, 
but he had not succeeded. The Power remained in the hands of Pilsudski's 
friends, the Colonels' Group, who "proceeded rapidly to accumulate wealth 
and honours, free from the restraints imposed by the stern supervision of 
58Ibid., 075. 382-283. This philosophy reminds one of the writings of 
Eousseau and Hegel who thought that man was not free unless he was a member 
of the centralized State. Perhaps Poland was making a mistake by returning 
to the ideals of nineteenth century thought in the era of the twentieth 
century, an era of democracies and diet torships. However, perhaps she 
was a leader in a difficult age. The new Constitution was more than likely 
necessary in order for Poland to succeed as An independent nation. But the 
fact that other nations did not underst -nd nor accept it would of course 
have made it less workable. Today the Constitution of the French Republic 
is similar to the 1955 Constitution of Poland, and it seems to be necessary 
for France at thi3 particular time. 
5S)CHP. pp. 613-614. 
forbid., p. 614; Machray, 030. cit.. pp. 395-397* 
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Pilsudski."61    Those men included the Prime Minister Slawek,  the Foreign 
Minister Beck, end Colonel Adam Koc, the man who represented the trend in 
that group towards a .totalitarian system.62   The nation had been united in 
its support of Pilsudski;   it had never willingly followed any of the   'Group'. 
Now that Pilsudski was dead the nation was to become divorced from the 
government; dissension was to develop even among the 'Group'; an attempt 
was to be made by some of the government to return to a less totalitarian 
which ,. 
system than thatAthe   'Group' was advocating.    The two most patriotic 
who remained in the Polish Government were President Mosoicki and General 
Hydz-Smigly, who was named by Pilsudski as his successor to the post of 
Inspector-General.°3 
But because of the importance of foreign affairs, Colonel Josef Beck, 
the Foreign Minister became the most important figure in Poland after the 
death of Pilsudski.    In a message to the Poles shortly after Pilsudski's 
death, Beck stated that he planned to follow the same foreign policy that 
Pilsudski had followed.   But there were differences in Beck's personality 
that damaged Poland's place in Europe as a rather important power. 
Beck, like the rest of the  'Group' was receptive to flattery and 
seemed to be over impressed with his own importance.    Beck himself was 
a representative of the "swaggering, big-mouthed style of that regime." 
6lSeton-tevtson, oju cit.t p. 165. 
62Ibid.. p. 169; CHP,  p. 615. 
63Rose, Poland, pp. 23-25* 
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In contrast, Pilsudski seamed to be much more concerned with Poland's 
position than impressed with it,  and he also showed a grave concern for the 
general international situation.    At a time when the Allies were following 
a policy of isolation,  and when Germany was building up her strength, 
Pilsudski felt that Poland should take an independent policy in order not 
to become an object of bargaining by other nations.    This was the policy 
he used in negotiations while he was alive.    Beck made the mistake of 
continuing the policy Ion? after the situation had changed as a result of 
the grovin;; power ^nd strength of Germany and Soviet .Russia. ^ 
Without the ability that Pilsudski had for analyzing situations, 
Beck became caught in a web from which he was unable to release himself. 
He meant well, but he did not seem to possess the intelligence needed by 
a Foreign Minister.    He thought that he was putting first and last the 
interests of Poland.    For that very res-son he became a tool of German 
inperialism.65    Beck failed to realize that his association with Germany 
was merely a passing situation as far as Hitler was ooncerned.    Poland,  to 
him, was a great Power, able to dominate policy as easily as she accepted it, 
The agentsof Hitler apparently approached Beck with great flattery. 
He believed it all.    When he did aot as an auxiliary of Hitler, he always 
acteci in the name of the Polish Republic, for he was not conscious that he 
was Hitler's stooge or ally.    Beck felt self-confident and secure in his 
policy.    It evidently never occurred to him that to be an ally of Germany 
^Samuel L. Sharp, Poland. Vfliite. gggle. on a Red. Field (Cambridge at the 
University Pres3, 1953)> PP» 132-133. 
65Machray,  op. oit.. p. 60;  Seton-Watson,   opacity pp. 387-388. 
Seton-Watson als~ays that Beck did not like Germany.   All others say 
that Beck liked Germany and hated Prance for personal reasons. 
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guaranteed for Germany no intervention by France,  for Poland was a member of 
the French Security System.66 
Colonel Beck was an advocate of bilateralism j-nd wanted no other 
tyno of treaty.    He was especially against collective security and helped 
to destroy it for Poland in Eastern Europe.    The occupation of the free 
port of Danzig by the Nazis in 1958, apparently was not sufficient evidence 
to Beok that Poland was to fall under German occupation.6' 
By March 1939, the Polish nation was distressed by Beck's policies. 
His reputation was falling quite rapidly.    Attempts had been made by 
President Moscicki and Marshal Rydz-Smigly to remove Beck from the 
Government.    Apparently for fear of losing his position, Beck changed his 
policy and signed an agreement with the British in 1939, in an effort to 
create a united front against German aggression.68 
Beck was not able to retain the prestige of Poland by relying 
strictly on the policy which had been Pilsudski's in 1933-1934.    Conditions 
had ohanged.    Beck's policy did not change with them.    One wonders is 
pershaps Pilsudski would not have returned to his former alliance with 
the Allies after conditions began to show quite clearly that Germany was 
preparing to make a move.    This would have been in line with Pilsudski«s 
zigzag pattern of taking Whatever side provided the best interests for 
Poland.    Whether or not Beck could have changed the situation from 
1935-1939 by reverting back to a policy of conciliation when conditions 
OoSharp, op,. oi,t»,  pp. 137-140. 
frIbid.t  op. 140-143. 
68Ibid.. pp. 143-144. 
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called for it would be difficult to answer, but it most certainly would 
hare made hin look less like the clown that he appeared to be to the 
rest of Europe, and he would not have been so responsible for the 
situation ;hat developed. ' 
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CHAPTER V 
PILSUDSKI - DICTATOR? 
Was Pilsudski a Dictator?    This is the question most historians ask them- 
selves after a study of Polish political development between the wars.    There 
are similarities of Pilsudski to dictators of his time and to men of earlier 
times but there are also differences.    In historical background he was 
probably closer to Lenin than to any other dictator.    Both were taught to 
hate Tsardom by their mothers and both were greatly influenced by the 
attempted assassination of Tsar Alexander III in 1837, which sent Lenin's 
brother to the gallows and Pilsudski and his brother to Siberia.    Both lived 
for the revolution,  spending many years in poverty and exile while working 
for that cause.     Both were Journalists, organizers,  and effective speakers. 
Both split their parties.    Both rose to the head of a State, towered over 
their associates, won the worship of their people, and remained political 
forces in their respective countries after death.1 
But the differences between the two men were greater than the simi- 
larities. Pilsudski was a patriot; Lenin a universalist. Pilsudski was 
the realist} Lenin the doctrinaire. Pilsudski dominated Poland for nine 
years while Lenin ruled Russia for only five. Despite his long reign 
Pilsudski remained as great to the Poles as Lenin did to the Russians.2 
Even some of Pilsudski'a similarities to Lenin were different. He hated 
Tsardom for its oppression of the Polish people.    He wanted a revolution 
iReddaway, op. cit., p.317- 
2Ibid., pp. 317-319. 
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because he thought it was the one way Poland could free herself from the 
three Powers.    These were certainly not in accord with the reasons for Lenin's 
hatred of Tsardom and wish for revolution. 
Unlike two other modern day dictators, Hitler and Mussolini, Pilsudski 
did not concentrate all power in himself as  conspicuously as possible. 
Instead, he concentrated in himself only the minimum powers necessary for an 
efficient government.*    A contemporary of Pilsudski, who wrote in 1930 of the 
COup d'etat, said that Pilsudski wa3 a hot-headed patriot who would have 
gladly followed Mussolini's course if he had not met strong opposition from 
Parliament.'4   Of course this was a strongly anti-Pilsudski opinion.    Another 
writer of the same period who was more or less pro-Pilsudski felt that 
Pilsudski planned to legalize his position and intimated that Mussolini also 
tried to legalize his, but failed and was forced to dissolve Parliament.5 
In an earlier report written two weeks after the coup d'etat he declared that 
the government set up by Pilsudski waB neither a military nor a minority 
dictatorship, for it had the backing of labor and of many others who 
demonstrated against the government.6   It was a popular revolt against the 
Government. 
^CHP, p. 603, Patterson, op_. £*£., PP- H5-U6- 
hi. Tassin.  "Marshal Pilsudski," Living Age, CCCXXHX (December, 1930), 385. 
5F. H. Simmonds.  "Josef Pilsudski," Review of Rewle»s, LXXVII 
(May, 1928), $15. 
6P. H. Simmonds.    "Pilsudski's Coup," Literary Digest, LXHV 
(May 29, 1926), 10. 
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pilsudski was compared by one author with Oliver Cromwell after the 
execution of King Charles I.    Each had sturggled with a factious parliament; 
each having liberated his respective country was forced to govern it because 
of his strength in the nation.     But Cromwell had won his victories over his 
own English countrymen while Pilsudski's victories had been over foreign 
oppressors to Poland.    Cromwell was the idol of a party but Pilsudski was the 
idol of a nation.' 
The one definite attribute of a dictator that Pilsudski did possess, 
which is one  considered highly important by all dictators was the support of 
the army. '    But it must be remembered that the army of Poland was Pilsudski's 
creation.    He had started its formation in 1905 to fight for Poland before 
most Poles even dreamed of a united and independent Poland.    It would be 
difficult to imagine the Polish army other than loyal to Pilsudski.    Pilsudski 
was not a dictator; he was a Polish Patriot.    If he had wanted to be that, 
he would never have withdrawn as he did from the public eye.    He would have 
forced submission of the crowds to him.    This he never did.   Pilsudski 
probably did not want to be a dictator, but he would have been if he had 
thought that was what Poland needed in her development.    He liked secrecy 
and behind-the-scenes work.    From that vantage point he might have accepted 
dictatorship, but it would never have been for personal praise and glory. 
It would have been for what he thought were the best interests of Poland. 
7CHP, p.  60lu 
llachray,  Current History, XXXIII, 196. 
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Pilsudski was virtually in personal charge of Poland from November, 1916, 
to February, 1919,  as Chief of State, but instead of remaining such he called 
an election for a Constituent Assembly to which he promptly handed his power, 
apparently believing that freedom would produce a patriotic temperament in 
the Polish people which would wipe away all ancient fault3 and result in a 
solid blend of civic virtures.    Pilsudski wanted a State possessing the 
strength for self-preservation but also a democratic State.    He expected all 
Poles to be as patriotic toward Poland as he and to sacrifice all necessary 
for its good.    But in everyday life human beings do not behave as heroes, and 
furthermore, dissension developed among the Poles themselves.9 
Pilsudski put the interests of his country before that of his own com- 
fort.10   When the Polish people did not act likewise,  he said: 
I do not reproach the Polish people.    But I am a realist, 
taking things as they are, and not as I should like to see them. 
I strive, as I have always striven to look at them without 
illusion.    I profess wholeheartedly the principle of the world's 
greatest men, Napoleon; the art of breaking down obstacles is 
the art of not regarding them as such.   We Poles, alasi    excel 
in creating obstacles, and in suffering words to dominate reality. 
Throughout our own history we lack actual achievement.    In a 
narrow field we do well:    outside it, we shrink back from every 
obstacle...11 
Pilsudski knew Poland; he knew its past and its present, its weaknesses and 
its strengths; he was anxious to create a structure based on this knowledge. 
At one period, however, in the history of the independent Poland, the 
political enemies of Pilsudski were able to banish him from public life. 
The love of their freedom based on the idea of the nineteenth century 
12 
9Mizwa, 0£.  cit., 357-359. 
10Seton-Watson, o£. cit., p. 165. 
i:LReddaway.  o£.   cit.,  pp.   83-%. 
l2Mizwa, loc, cit. 
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democracy in addition to the evils they had suffered under arbitrary 
govemements, turned their heads from the ideas of Pilsudski. 
To think that freedom means  that one can do what one likes is 
to endanger society.    Better said, if carried to the limit, it 
make3 society impossible.    It also makes the state impossible, 
opening the doors to anarchy.    Not to realize that the essence of 
democracy is respect for law and order, to which one should sub- 
mit even if it means suffering injustice for the time being, is 
to court authoritarianism, or even tyranny.    This was the hardest 
kind of lesson for liberty-loving people like the Poles to learn.13 
The only solution was for Pilsudski to wait until people began to realize 
that this system was wrong for Poland at this particular time.    The country 
was neither secure nor prosperous.11*    After all, Poland was a new state 
which had not been able to develop politically as other nations.    History has 
demonstrated that it has been difficult for any nation to become democratic 
without first having some form of centralization under one leader.    One needs 
only to study the development of the nation state of France, England, or 
Russia to see that this is true.    The movement from strong rulers to weak 
ones caused the growth of nations not dominated by monarchs.    By 1937, Poland 
It is possible that 
was returning to more democratic methods.^if World War II, aad the advent 
of Communism in Eastern Europe had not occurred, Poland might be as demo- 
cratic today as any other so-called democratic state. 
While in retirement, Pilsudski still remained "the hero, the strong man, 
the born ruler" to many Poles.    Many feared him, but they respected him. 
Ke advertised and denounced the dishonesty of corrupt politicians.    He was 
contemptuous of parties, for they caused factions in the nation.    let, it 
-*Rose, GPP, p. 16. 
^SEP, p. 597. 
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was not in his nature to regiment people politically or to impose uniformity 
of ideas on them.    He was liberal in his policy, allowing as much political 
dissension as possible and would not tolerate action against the minorities 
in Poland.1'    He had no true program.    A writer in 1926 said of Pilsudski after 
he overthrew the Government: 
The critics of General Pilsudski, and there are many, declare 
that he was able to seize control of Polish affairs merely because 
of his influence with the army and not because of any constructive 
ideas that he had set forth.    They assert that he arrived at the 
helm with no plans of operation for the future and with no know- 
ledge as to the proper negotiation of a ship of state.    This is 
probably true, but the impression derived from conversations with 
him and the men he has put into office is that General Pilsudski 
himself is aware of these facts and makes no pretensions to the 
contrary.    The motive behind the military move of May was 
unquestionably exasperation at the futility of the Government 
which was nominally in power at that time.     The coup d'etat was 
not conceived for personal gain or aggrandisement.      It was not 
inspired by any particular set of ideas.    It was in fact merely 
the effective gesture of a man who had the power, making a pro- 
test against what he considered to be sacrifice of the best 
interests of his country to futile discussions.16 
Pilsudski had one chief aim in foreign policy, and that was to prevent 
Poland from being repartitioned by Germany and Russia.    He felt that this 
could be guaranteed only by a firm policy at home to maintain strength, a 
policy in international affairs of alliances with Germany and Russia to 
guarantee boundaries, and alliances with Roumania and France in case Poland 
should once again have to fight for liberty.17   The boldness and self-confi- 
dence of Pilsudski aided him in his foreign policy, for despite the newness 
of Poland and its undevelopment, Europe listened while Pilsudski was active. 
l5CHP, pp.  596-597, 612-613. 
l6J. D. Whelply. "Pilsudski, Man of the Hour in Poland," Current History,, 
1X7 (December, 1926), J54*    - 
17K. Malecka and Godfrey Lias.    "Sailorman Diplomat," Christian Science 
Monitor, (September 16, 1936), 3. 
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What might seem an exaggeration of some statesmen was accepted from 
pilsudski as the word, for what he said he meant.^    This  could be debated 
if one interpreted the statement to mean that Europe did what Pilsudski 
wanted.    It probably only meant that Pilsudski was not necessarily regarded 
as a loud-mouthed minister of a second-rate Power.    He stood for peace and 
co-operation, for without them, there was serious danger of Poland's once 
again becoming a "bone of contention."    Pilsudski is quoted by Madame 
pilsudska as saying that no one should ever think that Poland would remain 
on good terms with Germany or Russia unless she could defend herself against 
them both.    Germany was not yet strong enough to make resentment over the 
Corridor j the Treaty with the flolshevisk would hold only as long as Russia 
was unsure of herself.    "When she is weak she is ready to promise anything," 
he said.    "But she is equally ready to break those promises the moment she 
feels herself strong enough to do so."1? 
Pilsudski was regarded an amateur solider by professional soldiers in 
Europe.    He had studied military history and military science on his own, 
and most of it had been from the great wars of Napoleon.    He also realized 
the special conditions in Eastern Europe and the "value of the material with 
which he had to deal."   Many professionals laughed at his out-dated methods 
and his ancient materials.   But Pilsudski«s courage and his skill as a 
strategist and a tactician overcame those obstacles.    Pilsudski was a born 
soldier who expected unquestionable obedience and wanted deeds, not words, 
when needed.    He carried these characteristics with him all his life, through 
l8Reddaway, og. cit., pp. 295-296. 
^Pilsudska, o£.  cit., p. 308. 
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military, political, and personal aspects.    He was unable to free himself 
from the habit of secrecy, and of direct action.20 
Poland needed these qualities in her leader at such a critical time as 
the fight for her independence.     Pilsudski may not have been the first to dream 
of a new Poland, but he realized it chiefly through his own character.    A 
romantic in his ideals, he fought for them realistically. 
No prejudice or illusion stood between him and his object. 
It was wholly independent; he received no theories at secondhand. 
He followed no masters, and learned from his own experfence only, and 
from that accumulated experience...He was as single in nind as he 
was independent, and singleness of mind gave him a clearness of 
vision which enable him to foresee events in a manner, which seemed 
to his followers miraculous.     His self-confidence was unbounded. 
To make a decision cost him an agony of thought, but when it was 
made he had no doubt of it.2* 
For Poland he was ambitious and was willing to sacrifice himself to that duty. 
He knew both how to command and to take risks for his  cause.    The force of 
his personality drew followers to him, for people are more willing to obey 
those who also serve for a cause.     The hope of his idea was tc unite all of 
Eastern Europe in a great federation, but it was not to be realized, for the 
purpose of this plan—to protect Eastern Europe against Germany and Russia- 
was never understood by many of the people."     '/hen his plan did not work, 
he worked for freedom of the minorities in their cultural activities in 
20 
21 
Patterson, o£. cit., p. 93; CHP, p. 593; Mizwa, o£. cit., p. 365. 
CHP, p. ^15. 
22Pilsudski planned for Poland to be the dominant Power. This was one 
of the reasons for Maunderstanding and seems to be a justifiable reason. 
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Poland in order that they might become good citizens.    He had their support 
throughout his regime.  ■* 
Pilsudski has been called outstanding but few call him great.    In building 
Poland he achieved what only a great man could do, but his method of achieving 
that aim has  been a source of criticism for the historian.     "First a member 
of the Polish Socialist Party, then of the Fracticn, then not a Socialist at 
all, now for  the Central Powers, now for the Allies, long a bitter enemy of 
Powers    with which he later made ententes, a democrat who abored the parlia- 
ment until some thought him demented,  and who led troops to drive the Premier 
from office.. ."21i   It was one of Pilsudski's attributes that he cared not 
whether he was outstanding or great.    He was no pedant.     He was a patriot 
working for an independent Poland, and he was willing to follow any course 
whether straight or zigzagged to reach his goal.    T0 the Poles of the period 
between the two Wars, he was great; to the rest of the world--it mattered 
not to him.    He gave up the opportunity for dictatorship because he realized 
it was not the best type of government for Poland.    He probably realized 
that dictatorship most likely would not work in a nation divided into three 
sections which were not yet united in a true Polish national sense.    After 
one hundred and fifty years of subjection to other nations, one could hardly 
expect those sections to emerge free from all influences of the nations of 
which they were a part.    But it is amazing that after twenty years Poland had 
reached the status of a reasonably stable nation with a balanced budge, an 
army, a parliament and the power tc have others join in good neighborly 
23 'Patterson. o£. cit., pp. 67, 120-212, 125. 
Tleddaway, on.  cit., p. 319. 
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relations with her.    However, one critic of Pilsudski aaid that his achieve- 
ments had their shortcomings and weaknesses, that he was not the sole 
liberator of Poland nor successful in every respect. ^    That is quite true, 
but he was a leader, and he was recognized as such by the Poles.    Not only 
that, but he was an effective leader, and in Poland he was one of the 
greatest leaders they ever had.z&    The fact that he remained above any party 
system was a major aid.    No one faction was, therefore, able  to rule Poland. 
Paderewski was somewhat like Pilsudski in his patriotism, but he did not 
possess the political ability and knowledge of Pilsudski, which was necessary 
at such a critical time. 
It can be said that the solutions of Pilsudski for Poland's problems  have 
never been proved to be incorrect, and indications have shown that some of 
them were correct.27   France now has a constitution similar to that of Poland 
in 1935.    Plagued by the same problem of party factions,   France was forced 
to resort to a constitution favoring a stronger executive.    The fact that 
Pilsudski's plan has been followed by another country would certainly indicate 
that it was somewhat successful.   History will never really know, however, 
what would have happened for two reasons.    Pilsudski died too soon for any 
to know what would have been his next step in Poland.    Secondly, the reign 
of the Colonels after Pilsudski's death cannot easily be weighed, for the 
situation in Europe was brewing for a Second World War.    Poland was moving, 
2*Mizwa, o£.  cit.» P»  36U. 
26Mizwa himself recognized these characteristics of Pilsudski after he 
had made his criticism of Pilsudski. 
27 Reddaway, o£.  cit.,  p. 320. 
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in 1939»  toward a more democratic pattern in a revolt against the  Colonels, 
but the war interrupted its development.    It may also have been that the 
Colonels allowed more democratic methods in Poland because of danger of the 
war and fear that the Polish people would resort to civil war if they were 
not allowed more freedom and thus provoke the start of a World War. 
Pilsudski probably thought that the Colonels, men who had fought with 
him for Poland, would be as patriotic as he.    If he realized that he was 
wrong before he died, it was probably already too late to make any changes, 
for he was getting quite ill and unable to appear in public.    The blame for 
what happened after his death cannot be laid on Pilsudski.    The Colonels 
exploited his prestige in order to stay in power and made it seem that what 
they were doing in Poland was according to the wishes of Pilsudski.    But 
who can judge a man who followed such a zigzag pattern in his life except 
to say that from 1935 to 1939 he would have done what he thought was beat 
for Poland. 
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